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COOPERATIVE JUSTICE: UNDERSTANDING THE
FUTURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
COURT THROUGH ITS INVOLVEMENT IN LIBYA
Brendan Leanos*
In February 2011, the Libyan government began systematically and
ruthlessly attacking its own citizens in an attempt to put down a political
uprising. These attacks escalated into a full-fledged armed conflict between
the government and rebel militias that engulfed the country for several
months. With the old regime finally overthrown, and a new transitional
government now in place, Libya looks to mend itself and to undo decades of
oppression.
Although the conflict is officially over, the world’s attention remains on
Libya as the new government searches for ways to address the significant
challenges left behind by the revolution. One such challenge is bringing
members of the old regime to justice for crimes they committed both before
and during the revolution. As a start to this process, the government has
detained Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi, Muammar Gaddafi’s son and former de
facto prime minister, with the hope of trying him for crimes against
humanity. But because Libya shares jurisdiction over Saif with the
International Criminal Court (ICC), it is unclear what that trial will look
like or who will conduct it. This Comment seeks to help clarify how justice
should be pursued in light of the ICC’s governing principles and Libya’s
present circumstances.
This Comment first describes the evolution of international criminal
justice over the past century, which culminated in the creation of the ICC.
It then explores the ICC’s fundamental principles and goals, and offers
different ways to conceptualize them. Finally, this Comment observes some
of the domestic issues that Libya faces and concludes that, given those
issues, the ICC should work cooperatively with Libya to try Saif in his home
country.
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INTRODUCTION
In February 2011, the people of Libya rose up against their government.1
That government, led by Muammar Gaddafi (Gaddafi),2 responded with
anger, violence, and mass murder. 3 For the months that followed, armed
conflict pervaded Libya and threw the country into chaos.4 Ultimately, on
August 23, 2011, rebel fighters gained control of the capital city, Tripoli,5
and with it, the nation.6 After capturing and killing their former ruler a few
months later, 7 Libyans finally came face to face with the opportunity they
so desired—an opportunity to turn the page on their oppressed past and to
begin a new chapter as a free and democratic society. 8
But Libya still must reckon with its past. Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi (Saif)
and Abdulla Al-Senussi (Al-Senussi), two prominent members of Gaddafi’s
regime, 9 face charges before the International Criminal Court (ICC or
Court) for crimes against humanity for their role in the government’s

1. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, WORLD REPORT 2012: EVENTS OF 2011, at 595 (2012).
The uprising began with peaceful protests in Benghazi, Libya’s second-largest city, and
quickly spread west to other large cities throughout the country. Id.
2. Gaddafi’s name can be spelled in multiple ways. For instance, “Gadhafi,”
“Qaddafi,” and “Qadhafi” are all acceptable variations on the spelling. This Comment
follows the ICC’s spelling.
3. See Prosecutor v. Gaddafi, Case No. ICC-01/11, Decision on the Prosecutor’s
Application Pursuant to Article 58 as to Muammar Mohammed Abu Minyar Gaddafi, Saif
Al-Islam Gaddafi and Abdullah Al-Senussi, ¶ 20 (June 27, 2011), http://www.icccpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1101337.pdf (“[I]t appears from the Materials that people who
opposed [Gaddafi’s] regime [during the uprising] . . . as well as members of their families,
were arrested, tortured and in some instances even disappeared.”); HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH,
supra note 1, at 595 (observing the government’s use of live fire on peaceful protestors as
well as the “disappearance of hundreds of people suspected of involvement in antigovernment demonstrations”).
4. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 1, at 596–600 (describing the government
attacking civilians with mortars and rockets, laying “perhaps tens of thousands” of land
mines, and detaining thousands of people—both revolutionary fighters and civilians—in
undisclosed locations to be tortured, raped, and/or killed).
5. Libya — Revolution and Aftermath, N.Y. TIMES, http://topics.nytimes.com/top/news/
international/countriesandterritories/libya/index.html (last updated Mar. 7, 2012).
6. Cf. Karin Laub & Ben Hubbard, Libya Rebels Overtake Tripoli as Gaddafi Regime
Crumbles,
HUFFINGTON
POST
(Aug.
22,
2011,
2:12
AM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/08/22/libya-rebels-tripoli_n_932706.html (describing
the fall of Tripoli as marking the crumbling of Gaddafi’s regime and quoting President
Obama, who declared: “The future of Libya is now in the hands of the Libyan people.”).
7. Gaddafi was captured and killed on October 20, 2011. Libya — Revolution and
Aftermath, supra note 5. Indications are that rebel fighters executed him after capturing him,
and his death is now being investigated. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 1, at 599.
8. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 1, at 601 (describing the opportunity
Libyans have to rebuild their country).
9. The ICC notes that even though Saif, who is the late Gaddafi’s son, appeared to lack
any official position in the regime, he was essentially “Gaddafi’s unspoken successor and the
most influential person within his inner circle,” operating as the “de facto Prime Minister.”
Prosecutor v. Gaddafi, Case No. ICC-01/11, Decision on the Prosecutor’s Application
Pursuant to Article 58 as to Muammar Mohammed Gaddafi, Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi and
Abdullah Al-Senussi, ¶ 72 (June 27, 2011), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/
doc1101337.pdf. Al-Senussi was Gaddafi’s national head of Military Intelligence. Id. ¶ 84.
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reaction to the 2011 revolts. 10 In addition, they face the prospect of justice
at home, in Libyan courts.11 The question of where and how to try these
two men for their international crimes—a question that is complicated by
the current circumstances in Libya and by the dynamics of the international
criminal justice community—is what this Comment seeks to answer.
This Comment also raises several issues that apply more generally to all
of the ICC’s cases moving forward. These issues get to the heart of what
the ICC’s central goals are, how it operates to achieve those goals, and,
ultimately, its proper place within the international criminal justice
community.
The creation of the ICC marked a momentous occasion for the
international community—one that promised to redefine international
criminal justice, and bring stability to an area of law that has long been
unstable. 12 However, the Court—almost ten years old 13—faces a host of
challenges in making those goals a reality. Most notably, the ICC, a static,
centralized institution, exists in a world and operates in a discipline that is
dynamic and extremely nuanced. The Court’s ability to succeed and carry
out its mandate therefore depends on its ability to use its founding
principles to adapt to the various situations and cases it confronts. As this
Comment argues, some of that adaptation will require the ICC to
conceptualize those principles more broadly than the way in which the
Court’s founding statute ostensibly presents them. The current situation in
Libya provides an opportunity to explore what this process might look like,
and how the Court should think about its mandate moving forward.
Part I of this Comment provides background on the ICC, including its
structure, governing principles, and history, as well as its place in the
evolution of international criminal justice. Part II analyzes the two most
salient features of the ICC—the principle of complementarity and the
ultimate goal of ending impunity for the world’s most serious crimes—and
presents arguments for putting those features into practice. Part III then
describes the current political and legal landscape in Libya and introduces
the challenge of determining where to prosecute captured members of
Gaddafi’s regime. Part IV proposes a comprehensive solution to the
10. See id. ¶¶ 41–42 (listing the charges against Saif and Al-Senussi for crimes against
humanity). The ICC’s involvement in these cases, and in the Libyan situation more
generally, began when the U.N. Security Council issued Resolution 1970 and referred the
situation to the Court. See S.C. Res. 1970, ¶ 4, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1970 (Feb. 26, 2011); see
also INT’L CRIMINAL COURT, OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR, FIRST REPORT OF THE PROSECUTOR
OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT TO THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL PURSUANT TO
UNSCR 1970 (2011), ¶¶ 1, 22 (Apr. 5, 2011), http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/
A077E5F8-29B6-4A78-9EAB-A179A105738E/0/UNSCLibyaReportEng04052011.pdf
(discussing the Security Council referral and acknowledging the decision to initiate an
investigation in Libya).
11. See Prosecution’s Submissions on the Prosecutor’s Recent Trip to Libya ¶¶ 1–14,
Prosecutor v. Gaddafi, Case No. ICC-01/11-01/11 (Nov. 25, 2011) [hereinafter Prosecution’s
Submissions], available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1276955.pdf (describing
procedures the Libyan government has taken to bring Saif to justice).
12. See infra note 71 and accompanying text.
13. See infra note 91 and accompanying text.
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problem that the ICC faces in Libya, concluding that Libya and the ICC
should work together to prosecute Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi in Libya. While
this solution is narrowly addressed to the Libya situation, it also provides a
more general context in which the ICC should consider its work.
I. THE ROAD TO THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT
While the ICC is less than a decade old, the wheels leading to its creation
have been in motion for the better part of the past century. Part I of this
Comment chronicles the path the international community has taken to the
ICC by first describing the institutions that preceded, and formed the
jurisprudential basis for, the ICC. It then introduces the ICC and its salient
features.
A. Historical Development of International Criminal Justice
Over the past century, “millions of human beings [have] perished as a
result of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and other serious
crimes under international law.” 14 The global community’s attempt to
prosecute crimes under international law15 is known generally as
international criminal justice.16 Historically, the international criminal
justice community has been largely unsuccessful in keeping up with these
crimes and the human rights abuses that accompany them. 17 Nevertheless,
14. PRINCETON PROJECT ON UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION, THE PRINCETON PRINCIPLES ON
UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION 23 (Stephen Macedo ed., 2001) [hereinafter PRINCETON
PRINCIPLES]. The International Institute of Higher Studies in Criminal Sciences, in a
comprehensive project designed to assist international organizations and governments in
developing “an integrated approach to post-conflict justice,” found that between 92 and 101
million people have been killed as a result of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes,
slavery, slave-related practices, and torture since 1945. 1 THE PURSUIT OF INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL JUSTICE: A WORLD STUDY ON CONFLICTS, VICTIMIZATION, AND POST-CONFLICT
JUSTICE, at xiii, 3 (M. Cherif Bassiouni ed., 2010) [hereinafter PURSUIT OF INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL JUSTICE].
15. International law is defined as “[t]he legal system governing the relationships
between nations; more modernly, the law of international relations, embracing not only
nations but also such participants as international organizations and individuals (such as
those who invoke their human rights or commit war crimes).” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY
892 (9th ed. 2009). For a detailed discussion of how international law developed, see
generally Dapo Akande, Sources of International Criminal Law, in THE OXFORD
COMPANION TO INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE 41, 41–53 (Antonio Cassese ed., 2009).
Substantively, there is a direct relationship between international crimes and international
human rights, in that international crimes are often considered “gross offences against
universal values.” Antonio Cassese, The Rationale for International Criminal Justice, in THE
OXFORD COMPANION TO INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra, at 123, 127.
16. M. Cherif Bassiouni, International Criminal Justice in Historical Perspective: The
Tension Between States’ Interests and the Pursuit of International Justice, in THE OXFORD
COMPANION TO INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 15, at 131, 131 (defining
international criminal justice as “the application of the principle of accountability for certain
international crimes, whether before an international or national judicial body”). Bassiouni
also states that the general “goals of international criminal justice are to: contribute to peace
and reconciliation, provide a remedy to victims and eventually some closure, and to generate
prevention through deterrence.” Id. at 140.
17. See Statements of the Presidents of the ICJ and of the International Criminal
Tribunals, in 1 PURSUIT OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 14, at 133, 134
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the work of that community, in creating visibility for international criminal
justice and giving life to a new kind of global jurisprudence, paved the way
for the ICC and the current criminal justice landscape. This section
describes that landscape and outlines the institutions and basic ideas that led
to its creation.
1. International Criminal Tribunals
The birth of the modern international criminal justice community began
with the creation of international criminal tribunals. 18 In general, these
tribunals are ad hoc institutions that arise from, and react to, conflicts where
serious international crimes and human rights abuses are alleged to have
occurred. 19 Ordinarily, these tribunals are temporary, are created by
international law statute or treaty, and exist to adjudicate a specific set of
crimes arising out of a specific conflict over a specific period of time.20
They also tend to use exclusively international judges and international law
in their proceedings. 21 And while their international features cause the
nation from which the conflict arose to lose some of its legal sovereignty,
the international community has welcomed international criminal tribunals
in exceptional circumstances. 22
In those circumstances, international criminal tribunals are thought to be
preferable for a number of reasons. First, when conflicts are severe and
atrocities are committed, public resentment may be so strong in the conflict
state that a fair trial and certain due process rights would be unavailable to
the defendant. 23 Thus, the impartiality of an international judge in an
international proceeding is sometimes necessary to protect these interests.24
Second, international criminal tribunals are likely to create more
international visibility than purely domestic proceedings, and a greater
amount of visibility is thought to help deter future violations and

(observing that until recently, “effective impunity reigned for those who committed
genocide, crimes against humanity and serious war crimes”); Establishment of an
International Criminal Court, U.N. TREATY COLLECTION, http://untreaty.un.org/cod/icc/
general/overview.htm (last visited Mar. 23, 2012) (“Most perpetrators of war crimes and
crimes against humanity throughout history have gone unpunished. . . . [T]he same holds
true for the twentieth century.”). José Ayala Lasso, former U.N. High Commissioner for
Human Rights, once observed, “[a] person stands a better chance of being tried and judged
for killing one human being than for killing 100,000.” Establishment of an International
Criminal Court, supra.
18. Cf. Cassese, supra note 15, at 123 (stating that international criminal justice in the
modern world is characterized by an increased use of international courts and tribunals).
19. See Florian Jessberger, International v. National Prosecution of International
Crimes, in THE OXFORD COMPANION TO INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 15, at
208, 209; see also Akande, supra note 15, at 41 (noting the jurisdictional restrictions of three
prominent international criminal tribunals).
20. See Jessberger, supra note 19, at 209.
21. See Cassese, supra note 15, at 127.
22. See Nadia Bernaz & Rémy Prouvèze, International and Domestic Prosecutions, in 1
PURSUIT OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 14, at 269, 270.
23. See Cassese, supra note 15, at 127.
24. See id.
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Third, international crimes “infringe values that are
conflicts. 25
transnational and of concern for the whole world community.” 26 Thus,
when such crimes are committed, the international community is thought to
be the proper community to “pronounce on [them],” and this
pronouncement can only truly occur through an international trial.27
Examples of international criminal tribunals in history begin with the
International Military Tribunal at Nuremburg (IMTN). 28 A product of a
multilateral treaty known as the London Agreement, the tribunal was
created at the end of World War II and exercised jurisdiction over “‘persons
who, acting in the interests of the European Axis countries, whether as
individuals or as members of organizations, committed’ crimes against
peace, war crimes and crimes against humanity.” 29 It succeeded in
prosecuting prominent Nazi officials thanks in part to its novel prohibition
on pleading an official position as a defense to criminal liability, 30 as well
as the defense that crimes were committed as a result of following a
superior’s orders. 31 Due to its “recognition that some crimes [can] be so
massive, so egregious, and so abhorrent to all decent people that they could
be truly described as crimes . . . against all of humanity,” 32 and its
commitment to successfully shedding light on those crimes, the IMTN is
considered a watershed event for the international criminal justice
community. 33
However, after the conclusion of the IMTN and its cousin tribunal in the
Pacific, the International Military Tribunal for the Far East,34 international
criminal justice did not take another significant step forward until the early
1990s, 35 when the U.N. Security Council established two new ad hoc
tribunals. The first, created in 1992, was the International Criminal
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), which was created to address
the “ethnic cleansing” that had occurred there beginning in 1991. 36 Shortly
thereafter, the Security Council set up the International Criminal Tribunal
25. See id. (noting that international criminal tribunals will create greater visibility and
thus “better contribute to international efforts against impunity”).
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 128.
29. Bernaz & Prouvèze, supra note 22, at 272 (quoting Charter of the International
Military Tribunal art. 6, Aug. 8, 1945, 59 Stat. 1544, 82 U.N.T.S. 279).
30. Before the IMTN, international law generally dealt only with conduct at the state
level, while “[the individuals] who [led] the conduct were protected from culpability under
the doctrine of state sovereignty.” Id. at 274. In terms of developing the system of
international law we have today and enabling that system to prosecute heads of state for
gross human rights offenses, see id. at 273 & n.12, this aspect of the IMTN was
“groundbreaking,” id. at 274.
31. See id. at 273.
32. Richard Goldstone, Lecture, International Human Rights at Century’s End, 15
N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 241, 244 (1999).
33. See Bernaz & Prouvèze, supra note 22, at 274.
34. See id. at 277–78.
35. See infra notes 72–75 and accompanying text (noting that the idea for an
international criminal court was first proposed in 1948 but not acted upon for over forty
years).
36. Bernaz & Prouvèze, supra note 22, at 283–84.
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for Rwanda (ICTR) to prosecute those responsible for the 1994 Rwandan
genocide. 37 Both tribunals still exist today. 38
The ICTY and the ICTR were significant to the development of
international criminal justice for a number of reasons. First, their very
creation reflected a firm and coordinated commitment within the
international community to punish gross violators of international criminal
law. 39 Second, the case law and jurisprudence from these tribunals has
helped develop, consolidate, and give shape to international criminal law.40
Third, and perhaps most important, the success 41 of these institutions has
proven that international criminal justice is more than just a dream, and that
purposeful international courts can have a real impact.42
2. Hybrid Tribunals
A more recent development in international criminal justice is
internationalized, or “hybrid,” tribunals. Like international criminal
tribunals, these are ad hoc institutions established to address past violations
of international criminal law. 43
The primary difference between the two types of institutions is that
hybrid tribunals have both international and domestic elements.44 For
instance, hybrid tribunals frequently use local judges or institutions in their
proceedings. 45 Precisely because they have national components, these
tribunals are “often regarded as giving more deference to state sovereignty
than [international criminal] tribunals.”46 This increased deference is
preferable in some circumstances because it allows the conflict state to
involve itself in the conflict resolution process, thus giving that state a voice
in the healing process while also helping it build up its domestic judicial
system. 47 Some examples of hybrid tribunals are the Special Court for
Sierra Leone (established in 2002),48 the Extraordinary Chambers in the

37. Id. at 289. For four months in 1994, extremist members of the Hutu ethnic group
systematically killed between 500,000 and 1 million Tutsi civilians, another ethnic group,
and moderate Hutus. Id.
38. See Jesse Melman, Note, The Possibility of Transfer(?): A Comprehensive
Approach to the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda’s Rule 11bis to Permit
Transfer to Rwandan Domestic Courts, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 1271, 1287 (2010) (explaining
that the Security Council has extended the mandates of both tribunals until 2013).
39. See Jessberger, supra note 19, at 210.
40. See id.
41. As of 2009, the ICTY had indicted 161 persons and convicted 48 (with 5 acquittals),
and the ICTR has indicted 94 persons and convicted 28 (also with 5 acquittals). Id. at 209.
42. See id. at 209–10.
43. Bernaz & Prouvèze, supra note 22, at 293–94.
44. Id. at 294.
45. See Cassese, supra note 15, at 129.
46. Bernaz & Prouvèze, supra note 22, at 294.
47. Id. (noting that hybrid tribunals include states more in the post-conflict process,
which leads them to be preferable to international tribunals in situations that require
sensitivity to local issues).
48. Id. at 302–07.
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Court of Cambodia (2005), 49 the War Crimes Chamber in BosniaHerzegovina (2005), 50 and the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (2007).51
3. Domestic Courts
International criminals need not be tried in international institutions;
national court systems may, and frequently have, assumed this
responsibility. 52 From a legal standpoint, national domestic courts exercise
jurisdiction over international crimes in a couple of ways, depending on the
“constitutional position of international law within the law of that state.”53
Some states allow national courts to try international crimes directly,
without requiring that the international law be implemented into the
domestic legal regime. 54 In those states, courts exercise jurisdiction over an
international crime simply by virtue of the fact that the crime is punishable
in international law.55
More commonly, however, domestic courts may apply international law
only if the state’s legislation has incorporated the law.56 Practically
speaking, this requirement does not usually impede a domestic court’s
ability to try international crimes, because international treaties often
require national legislatures to include certain international crimes in
domestic law. 57 And to the extent that domestic legislation does not
directly implement international law, and thus does not feature the same
definitions or language, domestic legislation often includes analogous laws
that are based on international law principles.58
In addition to requiring a legal basis upon which to try an international
crime, state domestic courts also need jurisdiction over the perpetrator.
Jurisdiction can arise in a number of ways. First, “[u]nder . . . one of the
most basic aspects of state sovereignty, states have jurisdiction over crimes
committed in their territory.” 59 This notion is known as the territorial
principle of jurisdiction, and applies regardless of the perpetrator’s
citizenship. 60 Second, in what is known as the nationality principle, a “state
49. Id. at 307–12.
50. Id. at 312–15.
51. Id. at 316–22.
52. See Jessberger, supra note 19, at 208 (“History . . . shows notable domestic efforts to
address international crimes by means of criminal law.”).
53. Akande, supra note 15, at 41.
54. Id. at 41–42. Akande notes that this scenario is typical in many common law
countries, such as the United States and United Kingdom. Id. at 42 (providing examples
where courts in these states “have recognized that international law may create crimes
subject to domestic prosecution without the need for domestic legislation”).
55. See id. at 42–43.
56. See id. at 41–42.
57. See id. at 42 (“For example, domestic legislation criminalizing genocide, war crimes,
and torture [is] enacted in order to implement the state’s obligations under the Genocide
Convention [of] 1948, the GCs of 1949 or the 1984 Torture Convention.” (emphasis
omitted)).
58. See id.
59. Bartram S. Brown, Primacy or Complementarity: Reconciling the Jurisdiction of
National Courts and International Criminal Tribunals, 23 YALE J. INT’L L. 383, 391 (1998).
60. See id.
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has jurisdiction to prosecute its own nationals for crimes even when
committed outside of its own territory.” 61 Both the territorial and
nationality principles are ordinary and relatively undisputed jurisdictional
premises. 62
Two other concepts may also give state domestic courts jurisdiction over
international crimes: the passive personality principle, under which “states
may claim jurisdiction over crimes committed against their nationals
wherever they may occur,” 63 and “the protective principle, which grants
states jurisdiction over aliens for acts committed abroad but that present a
threat to the security of the state.”64
Under a concept known as universal jurisdiction, states are also entitled
to bring domestic proceedings against the perpetrator of certain crimes
based solely on the nature of the crime. 65 Universal jurisdiction holds that
these crimes—namely genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and
torture—are considered “so harmful to international interests” and basic
human rights that domestic courts anywhere in the world can prosecute
them, and might be obligated to do so.66 As a result, a domestic court may
apply universal jurisdiction irrespective of a crime’s location or the
perpetrator’s nationality. 67 Although rarely used, 68 universal jurisdiction is
nevertheless considered to be a very powerful concept that “holds promise
for . . . justice for the victims of serious human rights violations around the
world.” 69
B. The ICC
Despite the development and growing prevalence of international
criminal justice over the past seventy years, gaps and inefficiencies
remained in the international community’s quest to prosecute the growing
number of international crimes and atrocities.70 In an attempt to close these
61. Id.
62. Id. at 391–92.
63. Id. at 392.
64. Id.
65. PRINCETON PRINCIPLES, supra note 14, at 16.
66. Id. For instance, “[f]or crimes such as torture and grave breaches of the Geneva
Conventions, the relevant treaties say clearly that offenders who are found within the
territory of a state must be prosecuted or extradited to face prosecution elsewhere.” INT’L
COUNCIL ON HUMAN RIGHTS POLICY, HARD CASES: BRINGING HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATORS TO
JUSTICE ABROAD, A GUIDE TO UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION 37 (1999).
67. PRINCETON PRINCIPLES, supra note 14, at 16.
68. Courts have historically used universal jurisdiction in the context of the international
crime of piracy. See Anthony J. Colangelo, Constitutional Limits on Extraterritorial
Jurisdiction: Terrorism and the Intersection of National and International Law, 48 HARV.
INT’L L.J. 121, 130 (2007) (citing United States v. Furlong, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 184, 195–97
(1820)). In modern times, the most prominent use of universal jurisdiction occurred in 1999
when Spain sought the extradition of Augusto Pinochet from England in order to prosecute
him for human rights violations he committed as President of Chile. See generally INT’L
COUNCIL ON HUMAN RIGHTS POLICY, supra note 66, at 1–2, 29–34.
69. PRINCETON PRINCIPLES, supra note 14, at 18.
70. See Jessberger, supra note 19, at 210 (observing that international criminal tribunals
are often subject to criticisms of “malfunctions and missed opportunities,” and that efforts to

2012]

LIBYA AND THE ICC

2277

gaps, the United Nations sought to create a permanent international criminal
court. 71 This section introduces that court and describes some of its central
features. It first briefly describes the creation of the ICC. It then introduces
the Rome Statute, which provides the statutory basis for the ICC. Finally,
this section describes the ICC’s most important and distinctive feature: the
principle of complementarity.
1. Creating the ICC
The U.N. first formulated the idea of a permanent international criminal
court in 1948, when the General Assembly (GA) adopted Resolution 260.72
In that Resolution, the GA recognized the need for an international criminal
court and invited the International Law Commission (ILC) to study the
possibility and desirability of establishing one. 73 Although the ILC
prepared several draft statutes pursuant to the Resolution, a number of
factors caused the GA to put the idea on hold. 74
This remained so until 1989 when Trinidad and Tobago, seeking a new
means to prosecute drug trafficking, requested that the GA revisit the idea
of a permanent international criminal court. 75 At that time, the ILC
prepared another draft statute 76 to be presented at a diplomatic
conference. 77 That conference, which met in Rome in the summer of
1998, 78 turned that draft into the statutory and legal blueprint for the ICC:
the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (Rome Statute or
Statute). 79

prosecute in domestic courts “have been highly selective, largely uncoordinated, and, in sum,
not satisfactory”).
71. See Establishment of an International Criminal Court, supra note 17 (indicating that
one of the central reasons for establishing the ICC was to remedy deficiencies in the current
transitional justice landscape).
72. Bernaz & Prouvèze, supra note 22, at 323.
73. See Establishment of an International Criminal Court, supra note 17.
74. See Bernaz & Prouvèze, supra note 22, at 323–24 (citing, as reasons for the delay,
the Cold War and a lack of a consensus over a definition of the crime of aggression).
75. See Establishment of an International Criminal Court, supra note 17.
76. Id. The draft was prepared just after the Security Council established the ICTY and
the ICTR, id., further demonstrating the impact these tribunals had on establishing the ICC.
77. See Bernaz & Prouvèze, supra note 22, at 324. The GA established two ad hoc
committees to review and consolidate the draft statute: the Ad Hoc Committee on the
Establishment of an International Criminal Court, and the Preparatory Committee on the
Establishment of an International Criminal Court. Id.
78. Id. at 324–25. The conference was formally called the United Nations Diplomatic
Conference on Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court
(Rome Conference). It met between June 15, 1998 and July 17, 1998. Id.
79. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 1, July 17, 1998, 2187
U.N.T.S. 90 (amended 2010) [hereinafter Rome Statute], available at www.icccpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/ADD16852-AEE9-4757-ABE7-9CDC7CF02886/283503/
RomeStatutEng1.pdf. The Statute officially entered into force on July 1, 2002. See Bernaz
and Prouvèze, supra note 22, at 332.
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2. The Rome Statute
The Rome Statute is a carefully articulated, skillfully negotiated80
document that not only created the ICC, 81 but also established what kinds
of cases the Court may hear, the process by which it hears them, and how
the Court should deal with issues that it confronts. While a comprehensive
outline of the Rome Statute is beyond the scope of this Comment, this
section describes its most salient features and provides a background for the
issues that will confront the Court as its involvement in Libya progresses.
The Statute first establishes the Court as “a permanent institution [with]
the power to exercise its jurisdiction over persons for the most serious
crimes of international concern.” 82 The Statute then lists those crimes as
genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and the crime of
aggression, 83 defining each with specificity. 84 Structurally, although the
ICC is a single institution, the Rome Statute divides it into four organs: the
Presidency, Chambers, Office of the Prosecutor, and Registry. 85 While
these organs work together to collectively achieve the Court’s objectives,
they maintain their own responsibilities and immediate priorities. For
instance, the Chambers constitutes the judiciary of the ICC and, with its
three subdivisions, 86 is responsible for conducting trials and managing
cases. 87 The Prosecutor’s Office, on the other hand, operates independently
from the Court 88 and is responsible for investigating potential cases,
conducting investigations, and advocating before the Court. 89

80. See generally Mahnoush H. Arsanjani, The Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court, 93 AM. J. INT’L L. 22 (1999); M. Cherif Bassiouni, Negotiating the Treaty of
Rome on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, 32 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 443
(1999); Philippe Kirsch & John T. Holmes, The Rome Conference on an International
Criminal Court: The Negotiating Process, 93 AM. J. INT’L L. 2 (1999).
81. See Rome Statute, supra note 79, art. 1.
82. Id.
83. Id. art. 5. The Court may not exercise jurisdiction over the crime of aggression until
after January 1, 2017. Id. art. 15bis(3).
84. Even if a crime fits within these definitions, however, the Court may only exercise
jurisdiction if certain conditions are satisfied. For an overview of some of these conditions,
see infra notes 118–28 and accompanying text. For other examples of what aspects of a case
may or may not prevent the ICC from having jurisdiction, see the Rome Statute, supra note
79, art. 27(1) (extending jurisdiction over individuals regardless of their official capacity),
art. 29 (declining to limit the ICC’s jurisdiction to the statute of limitations to which a crime
might otherwise be subject), and art. 11 (declining jurisdiction if the crime was committed in
a state before it became a Party to the Statute).
85. Rome Statute, supra note 79, art. 34.
86. The three subdivisions of the Chambers are the Pre-Trial Division, Trial Division,
and Appeals Division. See id. art. 39. The responsibilities of each division vary based on the
stage of a particular case before the court. See id.
87. See id.
88. See id. art. 42(1) (“The Office of the Prosecutor shall act independently as a separate
organ of the Court.”). As a whole, the Court’s relationship to the U.N. mirrors the
Prosecutor’s relationship with the ICC, in that while the ICC exists within the U.N. system,
it operates as an independent institution. See id. pmbl. (establishing the ICC as an
“independent permanent [court] in relationship with the [U]nited Nations system”).
89. See id. art. 42(1).
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As of this writing, there are 120 States Parties to the Rome Statute.90
Compared to the 105 states that were original signatories in 1998, and the
60 that had ratified it as of July 1, 2002, 91 the Court’s current membership
demonstrates its growing support from the international community. 92 And
although the ICC has conducted only one full trial thus far, 93 the Court has
initiated trial proceedings in two more cases 94 and investigated many
others. 95
3. The Principle of Complementarity
This section explains one of the most significant and unique features of
the ICC: the principle of complementarity. The section begins by
explaining the theoretical and practical bases for the principle. The section
then describes the manifestation of the principle in the Rome Statute.
a. The Theoretical and Practical Foundations of the Principle
of Complementarity
All of the Court’s work is guided by a single phrase in the Rome
Statute—a phrase so important that it appears twice. The preamble and
article 1 both state that the ICC “shall be complementary to national
criminal jurisdictions.” 96 This statement is broadly referred to as the
principle of complementarity, and, as many commentators have noted, it is
the cornerstone of the Rome Statute and the foundation upon which the ICC
is built. 97
90. See The States Parties to the Rome Statute, INT’L CRIM. CT., http://www.icccpi.int/Menus/ASP/states+parties/ (last visited Mar. 23, 2012). The United States is not
currently a State Party to the Rome Statute. See id. For an explanation of why the U.S. did
not join, see Bartram S. Brown, U.S. Objections to the Statute of the International Criminal
Court: A Brief Response, 31 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 855 (1999).
91. See Bernaz & Prouvèze, supra note 22, at 328.
92. See Judge Sang-Hyun Song, President of the Int’l Criminal Court, Address to the
U.N. General Assembly 2 (Oct. 26, 2011), available at http://www.icccpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/D5CA5004-362D-4C37-86D8-01B6F6E7642B/283903/11026ICC
PresidentspeechtoUNGAENG.pdf (acknowledging his delight “that international support for
the ICC has continued to grow”).
93. Id. at 3 (“The ICC’s first trial concluded in August [2011] with closing statements
against Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, charged with the use of child soldiers in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo.”). The Court entered a guilty verdict against Dyilo on March 14,
2012. Prosecutor v. Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Judgment Pursuant to Article 74 of
the Statute, ¶ 1358 (Mar. 14, 2012), www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1379838.pdf.
94. See Song, supra note 92 (noting that the presentation of evidence is “nearing its
conclusion” in one trial, and that a third trial opened in November, 2010). A fourth trial is in
its preparation stages. See id.
95. See
Situations
and
Cases,
INT’L
CRIM.
CT.,
http://www.icccpi.int/Menus/ICC/Situations+and+Cases (last visited Mar. 23, 2012) (noting that, in total,
“14 cases in 7 situations have been brought before the [ICC]”).
96. Rome Statute, supra note 79, pmbl., art. 1.
97. See, e.g., Jimmy Gurulé, United States Opposition to the 1998 Rome Statute
Establishing an International Criminal Court:
Is the Court’s Jurisdiction Truly
Complementary to National Criminal Jurisdictions?, 35 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 1, 7 (2002)
(“The complementarity regime is one of the cornerstones on which the [ICC is] built.”);
Michael A. Newton, Comparative Complementarity: Domestic Jurisdiction Consistent with
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In practice, this principle is meant to limit the ICC’s jurisdictional scope
by giving primary jurisdiction over crimes to national criminal
jurisdictions. 98 This dynamic between the ICC and domestic courts stands
in contrast to the operations of the ICTY and the ICTR, 99 as their charters
give them jurisdictional primacy over the domestic courts with whom they
share jurisdiction. 100
Considered against the backdrop of the ICC’s predecessor institutions,
the complementarity principle thus reflects the Court’s somewhat
paradoxical identity: while the ICC is the most ambitious criminal court
ever created in terms of the scope of its goals and the gravity of the crimes
on which it focuses, 101 its power to actually try cases is limited by elements
that are primarily outside of its control. 102 Luis Moreno-Ocampo, the
ICC’s first Chief Prosecutor, acknowledged this tension at his swearing-in
ceremony on June 16, 2003 when he said, “As a consequence of
complementarity, the number of cases that reach the Court should not be a
measure of its efficiency. On the contrary, the absence of trials before [the]
Court, as a consequence of the regular functioning of national institutions,
would be a major success.” 103 Thus, given the Court’s broad ambition and
status in the international criminal justice community, the ICC’s
jurisdictional power has been described as timid. 104
Drafters of the Statute, however, consciously constructed this timidity to
serve both a theoretical and practical purpose. 105 Theoretically, the
complementarity principle serves to demonstrate respect for the sovereignty
of national jurisdictions. 106 Practically, and perhaps more importantly in
the eyes of some commentators, the complementarity principle allows the
international criminal justice community to allocate its collective resources
in ways that most efficiently and effectively achieve the Rome Statute’s
fundamental goals. 107 The principle does this in a number of ways.

the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 167 MIL. L. REV. 20, 29 (2001) (“The
principle of complementarity is . . . the bridge that carries the weight of the Rome Statute.”).
98. See Newton, supra note 97, at 26–29.
99. See supra notes 36–37 and accompanying text.
100. For a discussion of the primacy of the ICTY, see Brown, supra note 59, at 395–96.
For a discussion of the primacy of the ICTR, see Melman, supra note 38, at 1280–81.
101. See Rome Statute, supra note 79, pmbl., art. 1, art. 5 (highlighting the ICC’s
commitment to fighting the world’s “most serious crimes”).
102. See INT’L CRIMINAL COURT, OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR, INFORMAL EXPERT PAPER:
THE PRINCIPLE OF COMPLEMENTARITY IN PRACTICE ¶ 1 (2003) [hereinafter INFORMAL EXPERT
PAPER], available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc654724.pdf (“The Statute
recognizes that States have the first responsibility and right to prosecute international
crimes.”).
103. Id. (quoting Luis Moreno-Ocampo, Chief Prosecutor of the ICC, Ceremony for the
Solemn Undertaking of the Chief Prosecutor (June 16, 2003)).
104. Brown, supra note 90, at 878.
105. INFORMAL EXPERT PAPER, supra note 102, ¶ 1 (“The principle of complementarity is
based both on respect for the primary jurisdiction of States and on considerations of
efficiency and effectiveness . . . .”).
106. See Gregory S. Gordon, Complementarity and Alternative Justice, 88 OR. L. REV.
621, 628 (2009).
107. Id. at 627–28; INFORMAL EXPERT PAPER, supra note 102, ¶¶ 1–2.
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First, the ICC has limited resources in terms of financing, infrastructure,
and personnel, 108 and thus can only feasibly prosecute a small number of
cases per year. 109 Therefore, the sheer impossibility of the Court achieving
its goals on its own necessitates that domestic courts share in the ICC’s
responsibility. 110 Moreover, it seems more efficient to give primary
prosecutorial responsibility to domestic jurisdictions because they usually
will have better access than the ICC to evidence and witnesses. 111 Finally,
the complementarity principle empowers domestic jurisdictions throughout
the world and encourages them to build up their domestic judicial
systems. 112 In the long run, this allocation will ostensibly help the global
community achieve the ICC’s fundamental goal of ending impunity for the
world’s most serious crimes. 113 For these reasons, the principle of
complementarity fundamentally guides all of the ICC’s work. 114
108. Gordon, supra note 106, at 627.
109. INFORMAL EXPERT PAPER, supra note 102, ¶ 1 (“[T]here are limits on the number of
prosecutions the ICC . . . can feasibly conduct.”). It is estimated that the ICC, given its
resources, can only conduct two to three trials per year. Lisa J. Laplante, The Domestication
of International Criminal Law: A Proposal for Expanding the International Criminal
Court’s Sphere of Influence, 43 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 635, 636 (2010).
110. See Laplante, supra note 109, at 645.
111. See INFORMAL EXPERT PAPER, supra note 102, ¶ 1; see also Gordon, supra note 106,
at 628 (“[T]hese domestic courts would likely have more means available to collar the
accused and to collect the necessary evidence.”).
112. See Gordon, supra note 106, at 628 (“[C]omplementarity enlarges the field of battle
against the culture of impunity by incentivizing a large number of domestic jurisdictions to
become more operational and effective at investigating and prosecuting cases of genocide,
crimes against humanity, and war crimes.”).
113. See id.
114. There is some debate within the academic community as to the validity of this
statement. Specifically, it is unclear in the eyes of some commentators whether the ICC is
required to comply with the principle of complementarity in cases that originate as referrals
from the U.N. Security Council, pursuant to article 13(b) of the Rome Statute. See infra note
125 and accompanying text. Professor Michael A. Newton, for instance, argues that the ICC
is not required to follow the principle of complementarity in such situations for two reasons:
first, a U.N. referral operates as a mandate that, by virtue of article 103 of the U.N. Charter,
all United Nations members must follow; second, in Council-referred cases, the ICC is not
required to formally notify any State Party that it has initiated an investigation, according to
article 18 of the Rome Statute. Newton, supra note 97, at 49; Michael A. Newton, The
Complementarity Conundrum: Are We Watching Evolution or Evisceration?, 8 SANTA
CLARA J. INT’L L. 115, 130–31 (2010) [hereinafter Newton, Complementarity Conundrum] .
Other commentators argue that because article 17 of the Rome Statute makes no distinction
between Security Council referrals and other types of cases in the Court’s substantive
admissibility analysis, the principle of complementarity applies equally to all cases. See
Mark A. Summers, A Fresh Look at the Jurisdictional Provisions of the Statute of the
International Criminal Court: The Case for Scrapping the Treaty, 20 WIS. INT’L L.J. 57, 79–
80 (2001). The Office of the Prosecutor has shed some light on the debate by concluding
that technically the ICC is bound by the principle of complementarity in all cases because all
cases are subject to the same substantive admissibility analysis. See INFORMAL EXPERT
PAPER, supra note 102, ¶¶ 68–69. Theoretically, however, the Security Council has the
power to create jurisdictional primacy for the ICC, even within the framework of the
complementarity principle, if it issues an order to the effect that member states must comply
with requests from the ICC, and the ICC requests jurisdictional primacy. Id. ¶ 69. But given
the reverence the Court has displayed for the complementarity principle, and the lack of
precedent that exists for the Security Council to issue such an order, see Elizabeth C.
Minogue, Comment, Increasing the Effectiveness of the Security Council’s Chapter VII
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b. Manifestations of the Principle of Complementarity in the Rome Statute
For all of its importance, the complementarity principle is not expressly
defined anywhere in the Rome Statute.115 Thus, in order to understand how
the ICC preserves the principle of complementarity, one must understand
“the provisions of the Rome Statute that bear [the principle’s]
fingerprints,” 116 and how they interact to give life to the complementarity
concept. 117 These provisions are those that outline (1) the requirements that
must be met for the Court to exercise jurisdiction over a case, (2) the
features of a case that might make it inadmissible, and (3) the procedural
mechanisms that guide the Prosecutor and Court to those determinations.
i. Jurisdiction
Before the ICC can have jurisdiction over a case, certain preconditions
must be satisfied. 118 These preconditions require, in certain cases, 119 that
either the state on whose territory the alleged crime took place (or if the
crime was committed on a vessel or aircraft, the state where the vessel or
aircraft is registered), or that the state of whom the alleged violator is a
national is a party to the Statute. 120 This requirement serves to ensure that
when the ICC exercises jurisdiction over a crime, the state or states that
might also have jurisdiction over the crime consent to, and accept, the
ICC’s jurisdiction. 121 If a state with jurisdiction over the crime happens not
to be a party to the Statute, article 12’s preconditions may nevertheless be
satisfied if the state affirmatively consents to the ICC’s jurisdiction.122
Authority in the Current Situations Before the International Criminal Court, 61 VAND. L.
REV. 647, 673 (2008), for all practical purposes it seems that the ICC is bound by the
principle of complementarity in Security Council referrals, just as it is in other cases.
115. See Newton, supra note 97, at 26; see also Alexander K.A. Greenawalt,
Complementarity in Crisis: Uganda, Alternative Justice, and the International Criminal
Court, 50 VA. J. INT’L L. 107, 134 (2009) (taking a slightly more cynical view of
complementarity, the author notes that “[t]he ICC . . . is an institution structured on a
relationship between national justice and international authority. Yet it is this very
relationship that the Rome Statute leaves fundamentally undefined, ultimately calling into
question the very justifications invoked to create the ICC in the first place”).
116. Newton, supra note 97, at 48.
117. Id. at 45 (“Complementarity is an intellectually simple principle that cannot be
distilled into one snippet of isolated treaty text.”).
118. Rome Statute, supra note 79, art. 12. These preconditions are in addition to the
basic requirement that the Court only has jurisdiction over certain types of crimes, see supra
note 83 and accompanying text, committed after the Statute entered into force, see Rome
Statute, supra note 79, art. 11.
119. The consent requirements in article 12(2) do not apply to cases referred to the ICC
by the U.N. Security Council. See Rome Statute, supra note 79, art. 12(2) (excluding article
13(b) from consideration); see also Newton, Complementarity Conundrum, supra note 114,
at 127–28.
120. Rome Statute, supra note 79, art. 12(2).
121. Id. art. 12(1) (“A State which becomes a Party to this Statute thereby accepts the
jurisdiction of the Court with respect to the crimes referred to in article 5.”).
122. Id. art. 12(3) (“If the acceptance of a State which is not a Party to this Statute is
required under paragraph 2, that State may, by declaration lodged with the Registrar, accept
the exercise of jurisdiction by the Court with respect to the crime in question.”).
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Article 12 is thus a significant check on the ICC’s power in that it
represents the notion “that the Court should not have jurisdiction where
states involved have not consented to it.” 123
Once a case meets these basic jurisdictional requirements, there are three
circumstances that would allow the Court to actually exercise its
jurisdiction over the case: (1) if it is “referred to the Prosecutor by a State
Party” 124 (state referral), (2) if it is “referred to the Prosecutor by the
Security Council acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United
Nations” 125 (Security Council referral), or (3) if “[t]he Prosecutor has
initiated an investigation in respect of such a crime” 126 (proprio motu
investigation). 127 These provisions, which provide multiple options for
initiating cases, emphasize that the ICC is meant to be an independent
institution whose authority and legitimacy are determined by legal and
international justice principles rather than political considerations. 128
ii. Admissibility
In addition to the jurisdictional requirements and preconditions that must
be satisfied before the Court hears a case,129 the Rome Statute requires that
a case also be admissible. 130 The interplay between jurisdiction and
admissibility is that the jurisdictional provisions give the Court power to
hear certain cases, based upon the nature of the case, the parties involved,
and how the case was initiated, while the admissibility requirement defines
the Court’s ability to use that power.131 Practically, the admissibility
regime helps guide the ICC in circumstances where it shares jurisdiction
Moreover, the admissibility requirement
with domestic courts. 132
represents the essence of the complementarity principle and serves to

123. Newton, Complementarity Conundrum, supra note 114, at 127.
124. Rome Statute, supra note 79, art. 13(a).
125. Id. art. 13(b).
126. Id. art. 13(c).
127. Id. art. 15(1). The elements of article 13—specifically the issue of how much
control over ICC cases the U.N. Security Council would have—were subject to somewhat
contentious negotiations. See Greenawalt, supra note 115, at 153–54. For instance, many
countries in attendance at the Rome Conference felt that giving too much power to the
Security Council would politicize and ultimately undermine the work of the Court. Id. That
concern is reflected in article 13’s composition. Id. at 154.
128. See Greenawalt, supra note 115, at 153–54 (“The ostensible reason [that the drafters
of the Rome Statute expanded case referrals beyond the Security Council] reflects
the . . . concern . . . that mandatory Security Council referral ‘would reduce the credibility
and moral authority of the court; excessively limit its role; . . . [and] introduce an
inappropriate political influence over the functioning of the institution.’” (quoting Report of
the Ad Hoc Comm. on the Establishment of an Int’l Criminal Court, U.N. GAOR, 50th Sess.,
Supp. No. 22, ¶ 121, U.N. Doc. A/50/22 (1995))).
129. See Newton, Complementarity Conundrum, supra note 114, at 131 (noting that the
Rome Statute’s jurisdictional requirements are a “legal inquiry distinct from admissibility”).
130. Rome Statute, supra note 79, art. 17.
131. See Newton, supra note 97, at 52.
132. See id.
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directly implement that principle in the Rome Statute.133 The admissibility
regime achieves this goal by providing both substantive guidelines and a
procedural mechanism through which to apply them. 134
Cases are presumed to be admissible. 135 The Rome Statute therefore
speaks of admissibility in terms of what would make a case inadmissible. 136
Article 17 lays out the criteria the Court considers in making that
determination, establishing that a case over which the Court has jurisdiction
is nevertheless inadmissible in four circumstances:
(a) The case is being investigated or prosecuted by a State which has
jurisdiction over it, unless the State is unwilling or unable genuinely to
carry out the investigation or prosecution;
(b) The case has been investigated by a State which has jurisdiction
over it and the State has decided not to prosecute the person concerned,
unless the decision resulted from the unwillingness or inability of the
State genuinely to prosecute;
(c) The person concerned has already been tried for conduct which is
the subject of the complaint, and a trial by the Court is not permitted
under article 20, paragraph 3;
(d) The case is not of sufficient gravity to justify further action by the
Court. 137

Emphasizing that these substantive elements of admissibility are a direct
reflection of the complementarity principle, the Rome Statute instructs the
Court, in considering this criteria, to have “regard to paragraph 10 of the
Preamble and article 1,” 138 each of which states that the Court “shall be
complementary to national criminal jurisdictions.” 139
The two most significant substantive concepts within admissibility are
reflected in articles 17(1)(a) and 17(1)(b).140 These provisions establish
133. See William W. Burke-White, Proactive Complementarity: The International
Criminal Court and National Courts in the Rome System of International Justice, 49 HARV.
INT’L L.J. 53, 76–82 (2008) (describing the statutory basis for complementarity in terms of
the Rome Statute’s admissibility criteria); Gordon, supra note 106, at 629–30
(“Complementarity is operationalized in the form of an admissibility examination set forth in
[the Rome Statute].”); Newton, supra note 97, at 52 (“The admissibility mechanism provides
the most direct implementation of the complementarity principle in the Rome Statute.”);
Newton, Complementarity Conundrum, supra note 114, at 126 (“[T]he text of Article 17
articulates the [States Parties’] agreed upon framework for assessing the balance of authority
and implicitly preserves the preference of the drafters for domestic power.”).
134. See Gordon, supra note 106, at 630–34.
135. Summers, supra note 114, at 69 (“The statutory scheme of the ICC presumes
admissibility.”). But cf. Gregory S. McNeal, ICC Inability Determinations in Light of the
Dujail Case, 39 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 325, 326 (2006) (“Nations are presumed capable to
prosecute cases.”).
136. See Rome Statute, supra note 79, art. 17.
137. Id. art. 17(1)(a)–(d).
138. Id. art. 17(1).
139. Id. pmbl., art. 1.
140. The other two substantive aspects of admissibility, which do not garner as much
scholarly attention but nevertheless contribute significantly to the cohesiveness of the
admissibility regime, state that a case is inadmissible if “[t]he [defendant] has already been
tried for conduct which is the subject of the complaint,” id. art. 17(1)(c), or if it “is not of
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that the ICC may only hear a case if its judges determine that the domestic
state with jurisdiction over that case is “unwilling or unable genuinely141 to
carry out the investigation or prosecution.” 142 With respect to the first
prong, article 17(2) instructs the Court that a state is “unwilling” to
prosecute or investigate if one of the following three scenarios exists:
(a) The proceedings were or are being undertaken or the national
decision was made for the purpose of shielding the person concerned from
criminal responsibility for crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court . . . ;
(b) There has been an unjustified delay in the proceedings which in the
circumstances is inconsistent with an intent to bring the person concerned
to justice;
(c) The proceedings were not or are not being conducted independently
or impartially, and they were or are being conducted in a manner which,
in the circumstances, is inconsistent with an intent to bring the person
concerned to justice. 143

The Prosecutor’s Office has characterized the “unwillingness”
determination as complicated and “technically difficult,” for it will often
require the Court to infer its conclusions from highly circumstantial
evidence, and those conclusions will often implicate “politically sensitive”
issues. 144

sufficient gravity to justify further action by the Court,” id. art. 17(1)(d). Article 17(1)(c)
refers to the concept of ne bis in idem, which is conceptually similar to the notion of “double
jeopardy.” See Gregory S. Gordon, Toward an International Criminal Procedure: Due
Process Aspirations and Limitations, 45 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 635, 687–88 (2007)
(citing Sean D. Murphy, Progress and Jurisprudence of the International Criminal Tribunal
for the Former Yugoslavia, 93 AM. J. INT’L L. 57, 79 n.43 (1999) (“[Ne] bis in idem
addresses the possibility of repeated prosecutions for the same conduct in different legal
systems, whereas double jeopardy generally refers to repeated prosecutions for the same
conduct in the same legal system.”)). The Rome Statute’s adherence to ne bis in idem, fully
articulated in article 20, presents a significant limitation on the Court’s power vis-á-vis
national criminal jurisdictions and also provides substantive due process protections for
individual defendants. See id. at 687–89. Article 17’s “sufficient gravity” requirement is
also an important element of admissibility, and, according to commentators, is another
requirement that demonstrates the Court’s commitment to complementarity. See Newton,
supra note 97, at 38–39; Newton, Complementarity Conundrum, supra note 114, at 134–35.
141. Meant to modify the terms “to carry out” and “to prosecute,” see INFORMAL EXPERT
PAPER, supra note 102, ¶ 21, “genuinely” injects a subjective element into the Court’s
admissibility requirement that some commentators find potentially problematic, see McNeal,
supra note 135, at 327–28; Newton, supra note 97, at 63–64 (describing how the Prosecutor,
without any institutional constraints, could potentially take advantage of that language);
Summers, supra note 114, at 76–77. The Prosecutor’s Office downplays these concerns and
contends that “genuinely” properly balances the principle of complementarity with the
Court’s fundamental goal of ending impunity. See INFORMAL EXPERT PAPER, supra note 102,
¶ 22 (describing how “genuinely” serves the Court’s need to assess the quality of national
proceedings, but does so by setting the standard low enough that domestic courts can reach it
if they are serious about achieving the same goals as the ICC).
142. Rome Statute, supra note 79, art. 17(1)(a).
143. Id. art. 17(2)(a)–(c).
144. See INFORMAL EXPERT PAPER, supra note 102, ¶ 14. This document also provides a
detailed list of indicia for the “unwilling and unable” determination. See id. at 28–31.
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The
Court’s
“unable”
determination
is
ostensibly
more
straightforward. 145 To make such a determination, the Rome Statute directs
the Court to “consider whether, due to a total or substantial collapse or
unavailability of its national judicial system, the state is unable to obtain the
accused or the necessary evidence and testimony or otherwise unable to
carry out its proceedings.” 146 To further assist the Court in this inquiry, the
Prosecutor’s Office has highlighted certain factors it finds particularly
relevant to determining if a national judicial system is “unavailable”: “lack
of necessary personnel, judges, investigators, prosecutor; lack of judicial
infrastructure; lack of substantive or procedural penal legislation . . . ; lack
of access [to the system]; obstruction by uncontrolled elements . . . ; and
amnesties [or] immunities.” 147
iii. Procedural Mechanisms
As significant as the Rome Statute’s substantive representations of the
complementarity principle are, in practice they are only as effective as the
procedural mechanism the Statute has in place to protect them. That
mechanism consists primarily of articles 53, 18, and 19.
Article 53 lays out the first steps the Prosecutor must take in order to
initiate any investigation.148 Specifically, it instructs the Prosecutor that,
upon receiving a referral from a State Party149 or the Security Council, 150 or
before beginning the process of initiating an investigation on his own,151 he
shall evaluate all the information available to him and decide if there is a
reasonable basis to proceed with an investigation.152 In making that
decision, the Prosecutor is instructed to consider three factors: whether (a)
it is reasonable to believe a crime has been or is being committed that falls
within the Court’s jurisdiction; 153 (b) “[t]he case is or would be admissible
under article 17;” 154 and (c) considering “the gravity of the crime and the
interests of victims, there are nonetheless substantial reasons to believe that
an investigation would not serve the interests of justice.” 155
In most instances, 156 if the Prosecutor decides to investigate a situation,
article 18 requires him to notify all states that would normally have
jurisdiction over it of his decision.157 If those states have already begun an
145. Id. at 15 (“An ‘inability’ assessment is likely to be less complex than an
‘unwillingness’ assessment . . . .”).
146. Rome Statute, supra note 79, art. 17(3).
147. INFORMAL EXPERT PAPER, supra note 102, ¶ 50.
148. Rome Statute, supra note 79, art. 53.
149. See supra note 124 and accompanying text.
150. See supra note 125 and accompanying text.
151. See supra note 126 and accompanying text.
152. Rome Statute, supra note 79, art. 53(1).
153. Id. art. 53(1)(a).
154. Id. art. 53(1)(b).
155. Id. art. 53(1)(b). The Prosecutor may also conduct a similar inquiry at any point
during the investigation as more information becomes available. Id. art. 53(2).
156. See infra note 161 and accompanying text (indicating that article 18 does not apply
to Security Council referrals).
157. Rome Statute, supra note 79, art. 18(1).
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investigation of their own, they may request that the Prosecutor defer
entirely to them. 158 That request will be granted so long as the Pre-Trial
Chamber determines that the state is willing and able to carry out the
investigation and prosecution genuinely. 159 This process constitutes the
Court’s preliminary ruling on admissibility. 160
Article 18, however, does not apply to investigations that begin as
Security Council referrals.161 Thus, the Court’s first determination on the
admissibility of a Council-referred case comes under article 19, either on
the Court’s own motion 162 or as a result of a challenge to admissibility.163
Challenges can come from three potential sources, including “[a] State
which has jurisdiction over a case, on the ground that it is investigating or
prosecuting the case.” 164 These challenges, which may only be made once
and before the start of a trial,165 have the effect of suspending the
Prosecutor’s investigation until the Court makes a ruling. 166
II. EXPLORING THE ICC’S FOUNDING PRINCIPLES AND GOALS
Given the ICC’s brief history and relatively limited experience
conducting investigations and prosecuting cases, the Court has had few
opportunities to put the aforementioned provisions of the Rome Statute to
work. Of the aspects of the Rome Statute that remain untested in practice,
two are especially significant:
those containing the principle of
complementarity, and those outlining the Court’s ultimate goal of ending
impunity.
Part II of this Comment explains the different ways to conceptualize
these two central concepts, with the hope that elucidating them and
exploring the ways in which they can be interpreted will help readers and
members of the international criminal justice community think about how
158. Id. art. 18(2).
159. Id. art. 18(2)–(3).
160. See id. art. 18. This initial ruling on admissibility is open to review as circumstances
change with respect to a state’s ability or willingness to investigate and prosecute. Id. art.
18(3)–(4).
161. Id. art. 18(1) (referring to articles 13(a) and 13(c), but not 13(b)). The likely reason
for not requiring notice in Security Council referrals is that “[i]n practice, the process of
generating a [Security Council] Chapter VII resolution would almost certainly give notice to
the affected states.” Newton, supra note 97, at 55.
162. Rome Statute, supra note 79, art. 19(1) (“The Court may, on its own motion,
determine the admissibility of a case in accordance with article 17.”). The fact that the Court
is not obligated to make a formal admissibility ruling, either in article 19 or article 18, is
consistent with the notion that cases are presumed to be admissible to the ICC. See supra
notes 135–39 and accompanying text. In contrast, article 19 makes clear that the Court must
ensure that it has jurisdiction over any case brought before it. See Rome Statute, supra note
79, art. 19(1).
163. Id. art. 19(2).
164. Id. art. 19)(2)(b). The other two potential sources of a challenge are “[a]n accused or
a person for whom a warrant of arrest or a summons to appear has been issued,” id. art.
19(2)(a), and “[a] State from which acceptance of jurisdiction is required under article 12,”
id. art. 19(2)(c).
165. Id. art. 19(4).
166. Id. art. 19(7).
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the ICC can most effectively put them into practice. Part II.A presents
competing conceptualizations of the principle of complementarity, while
Part II.B discusses the Court’s fundamental goal of ending impunity.
A. Competing Conceptualizations of Complementarity
By building itself around the principle of complementarity, the ICC
“reflects the notion that the sovereign nations of the world are joined . . . as
interdependent components of a larger global civil society . . . to promote
values fundamental to all democratic and peace-loving states.”167
Determining exactly how the complementarity principle defines the
working relationship of those components, however, is another challenge
entirely. Although the general concept behind the complementarity
principle, and even the principle’s manifestation in the Rome Statute, are
relatively clear, the principle’s role in actually defining how the Court goes
about its business remains subject to interpretation. This section outlines
two interpretations of how, in practice, the complementarity principle can
be conceptualized.
1. “Classic” (Passive) Complementarity
The prevailing interpretation of how the principle of complementarity
defines the ICC’s relationship with national criminal jurisdictions can be
called “passive complementarity.” 168 Under this interpretation, the ICC is
effectively a “‘safety net’ in place for those rare cases where no national
court system is willing and able to investigate allegations of serious
international crimes.” 169 Commentators who support this notion refer to
the ICC as a “last resort court,” 170 a court modestly designed to fill the gaps
where domestic courts are inadequate or fail in their responsibilities,171 and
“an additional [or substitute] forum [within the international system] for
dispensing justice.” 172
Proponents of this approach to complementarity ordinarily cite, as
shorthand for the principle itself, the “unwilling or unable” feature of the
Rome Statute’s admissibility analysis under article 17. 173 Effectively, this
interpretation construes the complementarity principle as a restriction on the

167. Laplante, supra note 109, at 649 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also
INFORMAL EXPERT PAPER, supra note 102, ¶ 6 (“The principle of
complementarity . . . prompts a network of . . . States Parties and other States to carry out
consistent and rigorous national proceedings.”).
168. See Burke-White, supra note 133, at 56.
169. Brown, supra note 90, at 878.
170. See, e.g., Julie B. Martin, The International Criminal Court:
Defining
Complementarity and Divining Implications for the United States, 4 LOY. U. CHI. INT’L L.
REV. 107, 109 (2006).
171. See Gurulé, supra note 97, at 6–7.
172. Newton, supra note 97, at 72.
173. See, e.g., Gurulé, supra note 97, at 7–8; Martin, supra note 170, at 108–09.
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Court’s power, telling it when it may not act and when it should instead
defer to a State Party. 174
2. Proactive Complementarity
In contrast with the “passive” vision of complementarity is the notion
that complementarity is actually an empowering mechanism for the ICC
rather than a restrictive one, allowing it to actively effectuate its vision of
justice throughout the world. 175 Professor William Burke-White, who
introduced this view and termed it “proactive complementarity,” posits that
the ICC should use the principle of complementarity to “participate more
directly in efforts to encourage national governments to prosecute
international crimes themselves.” 176 This concept envisions the ICC as an
international criminal justice catalyst, instead of as a court with purely
passive adjudicatory responsibilities. 177
In effect, Burke-White argues, conceptualizing the Court in such a way
would expand the ICC’s role beyond its classic formulation as just another
fixture in the international justice community and ultimately create a “tiered
system of prosecutorial authority.” 178 As the leader of that system, the ICC
would then be in a position to cooperate with domestic courts from the
beginning stages of an investigation and help them prosecute international
crimes. 179 Such a policy, he urges, is not only legally consistent with the
existing framework of the Rome Statute, 180 but would also allow the Court
to maximize its resources as well as its broader impact on the international
criminal justice community. 181
Proponents of this proactive complementarity concept contend that it
fulfills the principle’s basic purposes and the Court’s fundamental goals
more effectively than its passive counterpart. As Professor Lisa J. Laplante
explains, by involving domestic states in investigations and prosecutions to
the greatest extent possible, proactive complementarity allows the party
with the best access to evidence, witnesses, and local knowledge to
participate in an investigation and trial.182 In so doing, it advances one of
the fundamental reasons for having the principle in the first place.183
174. See Newton, Complementarity Conundrum, supra note 114, at 123
(“[C]omplementarity is best viewed as a restrictive principle rather than an empowering one
. . . .”).
175. See Burke-White, supra note 133, at 54–56.
176. Id. at 54. Professor Lisa J. Laplante concurs with Professor Burke-White that this is
how the ICC should conceptualize the complementarity principle. See Laplante, supra note
109, at 638. She also proposes extending the idea even further and applying it to situations
over which the Court lacks jurisdiction under Article 11, as well as situations that are
inadmissible under Article 17. See id.
177. See Burke-White, supra note 133, at 56.
178. Burke-White refers to this system as the “Rome System of Justice.” See id. at 57.
179. See id. at 54–56.
180. See id. at 76–85.
181. See id. at 56.
182. See Laplante, supra note 109, at 645.
183. See supra notes 108–14 and accompanying text (explaining the impossibility of the
ICC achieving its goals on its own).
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Furthermore, Laplante urges that using the principle of complementarity
proactively would allow the ICC to enjoy the benefits of a national trial
alongside the benefits of international expertise, similar to a hybrid
tribunal. 184 By allowing legal proceedings to be run at the national level,
she claims, the ICC would thus enjoy a greater perception of legitimacy and
would also provide a richer and more satisfying type of justice for the local
population. 185
As the Office of the Prosecutor’s informal expert paper on
complementarity demonstrates, 186 this proactive approach to the
complementarity principle is not an abstract product of legal academia.
Rather, based on some of the paper’s recommendations, it appears that the
ICC has contemplated some of the same ideas. For one, the paper
encourages the Chief Prosecutor to establish partnerships with domestic
court systems whereby the ICC would directly advise 187 and assist States in
initiating and carrying out domestic prosecutions. 188 This type of
relationship, which the paper makes clear is consistent with the Rome
Statute, 189 could also yield more long-term “cooperative anti-impunity
strategies” between the Prosecutor and domestic institutions. 190
The paper further supports the concept of proactive complementarity by
suggesting that the Prosecutor, in addition to assisting states during actual
investigations and prosecutions, could also provide training to those
states. 191 While acknowledging that this kind of cooperation might exceed
the Prosecutor’s express responsibilities, the paper nevertheless finds that
“such training would advance the overall objective of building a network of
[s]tates able to carry out effective prosecutions.” 192 The paper encourages
such a training policy as long as it does not appear to divert resources from
the Court’s more explicit mandates.193
The paper does acknowledge some of the risks that a policy of proactive
complementarity might pose in the context of the Court’s article 17
admissibility analysis. 194 The paper recognizes that if the ICC is actively
engaged in the domestic court system throughout an investigation, it may
not be able to extricate itself from that system in order to conduct an
184. See supra notes 44–46 and accompanying text.
185. See Laplante, supra note 109, at 645.
186. INFORMAL EXPERT PAPER, supra note 102.
187. Id. ¶ 11 (“Providing technical advice [about investigating and prosecuting mass
crimes] would also be generally consistent with the Prosecutor’s mandate.”).
188. Id. ¶ 3.
189. Id. ¶ 10 (citing Rome Statute, supra note 79, art. 93(10)).
190. Id. ¶ 3.
191. See id. ¶ 12.
192. Id. The paper additionally suggests that the Prosecutor may act as an intermediary
between States, helping them coordinate and complete their own domestic proceedings even
if the ICC would not otherwise be involved in the prosecutions. Id. ¶ 13. This suggestion,
and the level of cooperation between ICC and domestic courts it entails, echoes what
Professor Burke-White conceptualizes to be the logical end of a policy of proactive
complementarity: the “Rome System of Justice.” See Burke-White, supra note 133, at 56–
57.
193. See INFORMAL EXPERT PAPER, supra note 102, ¶ 12.
194. See id. ¶ 14.
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impartial admissibility analysis. 195 On the other hand, the paper observes
that the benefits associated with this conduct, such as encouraging fair,
efficient, and effective avenues for criminal justice at the domestic level,
outweigh the risks as long as the ICC is careful to take precautions against
them. 196
B. The Court’s Quest to End Impunity
Complementarity is the principle that guides the ICC to its goals, but it is
not a goal in and of itself. This section explains the most fundamental of
the ICC’s goals—ending impunity for the world’s most serious crimes—
and explores a number of ways in which the ICC might address it.
As expressed in the preamble to the Rome Statute, the ICC’s most
fundamental goal is ensuring that “the most serious crimes of concern to the
international community as a whole . . . [do] not go unpunished.”197 Based
on this language, the Court could be understood as simply a logical
extension of the international tribunals that came before it, concerned
narrowly with prosecuting certain crimes over which it has jurisdiction.198
But commentators, the ICC President, and surrounding provisions in the
Rome Statute suggest that the Court was designed with broader goals in
mind.
First, various phrases in the preamble indicate that the ICC’s ultimate
aim in prosecuting international criminals extends beyond pure punishment
and retribution for single crimes. Instead, the preamble makes clear that the
Court’s focus in ending impunity is “to guarantee lasting respect for and the
enforcement of international justice,”199 for the benefit of both “present and
future generations.” 200 Supporting this long-term focus, the U.N. has
explained that the ICC was created for the broader purpose of ensuring
peace and justice, deterring all future war criminals, and ending conflicts
Commentators have further echoed this sentiment,
altogether. 201
proclaiming that the ICC is “focused not simply on the goal of giving
particular defendants their deserved punishments, but also on the broader
aspiration[s of] . . . facilitat[ing] society-wide transformation by breaking

195. See id.
196. See id.
197. Rome Statute, supra note 79, pmbl.
198. See George P. Fletcher & Jens David Ohlin, The ICC—Two Courts in One?, 4 J.
INT’L CRIM. JUST. 428, 432 (2006) (arguing that a plausible way to think about the ICC is
simply as a “logical culmination” of the Security Council’s program to restore peace and
security following the ICTY and the ICTR); Ruti G. Teitel, Transitional Justice in a New
Era, 26 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 893, 902–03 (2003) (“The ICC can be understood to symbolize
the entrenchment of the exceptional Nuremburg Nazi War Crime Tribunals as a model for
the creation of a standing international war crimes tribunal to prosecute war crimes under the
international law of conflict.”).
199. Rome Statute, supra note 79, pmbl.
200. Id.
201. Establishment of an International Criminal Court, supra note 17.
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cycles of violence, delegitimizing criminal regimes, and fostering peaceful
societies rooted in the rule of law.” 202
So articulated, the ICC’s ultimate goals are often considered in relation to
the concept of transitional, or post-conflict, justice. 203 Transitional justice
is a rapidly growing academic discipline204 that refers, in its simplest terms,
to the conception of justice that emerges from periods of dramatic political
change “as reflected [by] primarily legal responses that deal with the
wrongdoing of repressive predecessor regimes.” 205 Transitional justice
works within a larger system that seeks to achieve “truth, justice,
reconciliation and peace” in conflict-ridden societies. 206 The fundamental
goals of that system are to rehabilitate and provide closure to victims, and
to allow societies to rebuild and liberalize.207 This process, it is thought,
cannot truly take place unless violators for past crimes are held accountable
for their actions. 208
As an institution committed to achieving accountability and international
criminal justice, the ICC recognizes the importance of promoting and
implementing transitional justice principles throughout the world.209
Commentators similarly recognize this connection between the ICC and

202. Greenawalt, supra note 115, at 128 (citing RUTI G. TEITEL, TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE 28
(2000)); see also M. Cherif Bassiouni, Introduction, in 1 PURSUIT OF INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 14, at xiii, xiv (framing the ICC’s mission broadly in order to
link the ICC’s capacity for international justice with the goals it sets out in the Preamble);
Laplante, supra note 109, at 640.
203. See M. Cherif Bassiouni, Assessing Conflict Outcomes: Accountability and
Impunity, in 1 PURSUIT OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 14, at 3, 7 n.5
(referring to transitional justice as post-conflict justice); Gordon, supra note 106, at 628;
Teitel, supra note 198, at 902–03.
204. See Lars Waldorf, Mass Justice for Mass Atrocity: Rethinking Local Justice as
Transitional Justice, 79 TEMP. L. REV. 1, 6 (2006) (observing the “burgeoning literature on
transitional justice”).
205. Teitel, supra note 198, at 893; see also TEITEL, supra note 202, at 5–6 (describing the
fundamental nature of transitional justice); Zachary D. Kaufman, The Future of Transitional
Justice, 1 ST. ANTONY’S INT’L R. 58, 58 (2005), available at http://users.ox.ac.uk/~
stair/1_1/kaufman.pdf (“Transitional justice involves states and societies shifting from a
situation of conflict to one of peace and, in the process, using judicial and/or non-judicial
mechanisms to address past human rights violations.”).
206. Bassiouni, supra note 203, at 7.
207. See Bassiouni, supra note 202, at xiv (describing the goals of “promot[ing]
accountability and rehabilitation for countries emerging from conflict and for victim groups
in need of closure”).
208. Bassiouni, supra note 203, at 7 (“[Transitional] justice is premised on an
understanding that domestic stability, security and democratic governance in the aftermath of
atrocity are strengthened by a commitment to accountability.”).
209. The ICC’s current President, Judge Sang-Hyun Song, said recently in a speech to the
World Bank Group that “[l]asting peace and prosperity in . . . post-conflict societies can only
be achieved if development challenges and justice enforcement are addressed in a
coordinated manner.” See Judge Sang-Hyun Song, President of the Int’l Criminal Court,
Keynote Address: Law, Justice and Development Week 2011, World Bank 9 (Nov. 14,
2011), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/038425E6-C9DD-465E-953CC56A81091D0C/0/111114ICCPresidentKeynoteSpeechAtWorldBank.pdf.
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more general transitional justice principles, 210 and urge the Court to make
transitional justice an even more explicit feature of its goals. 211
There is, however, an inherent difficulty in identifying the ICC with
transitional justice so directly. 212 As most commentators who study this
area emphasize, transitional justice is highly contextualized and particular
to a given society’s conditions,213 and is often defined by the conflict
itself. 214 Thus, experts recognize that “there is no ‘one size fits all’
approach to [transitional] justice.” 215 So for any transitional justice regime
to be successful, it is important for it to be sensitive to local conditions and
needs, and flexible enough to meet those needs. 216
As an independent, centralized, and supranational institution, the ICC
appears to some to be removed from these localized conditions and thus illsuited to provide comprehensive transitional justice solutions.217
Therefore, in order to remedy this perceived deficiency in the ICC’s
structure, some commentators have encouraged the ICC to actively
coordinate with domestic courts and other members of the international
criminal justice community. 218 This coordination, they hope, will ensure
that the ICC’s conception of justice incorporates local needs and promotes
long term, holistic solutions to the problems that gross international crimes
generate. 219
III. LIBYA
Part III describes the situation in Libya—a situation in which the ICC is
currently involved and which raises some acute issues related to the themes
discussed in Part II. Part III.A begins by describing the political and social
landscape in Libya following the nation’s recent revolution. Part III.B then
explains the ICC’s involvement in Libya to date, focusing on the upcoming
trial of Saif al-Islam Gaddafi 220 and introducing the various options that
exist for where and how to try him.
210. See Bassiouni, supra note 202, at xiv; Teitel, supra note 198, at 903 (“The
establishment of the ICC . . . is . . . a sign of the normalization of post-conflict law as the
global rule of law.”).
211. See Bassiouni, supra note 202, at xiv (explaining that framing the ICC’s mission
broadly to encompass transitional justice goals brings the Court more in line with the goals
the Rome Statute sets out in its preamble).
212. See Teitel, supra note 198, at 900.
213. See id. at 896–97.
214. In her book, Transitional Justice, Ruti Teitel articulates this notion by observing the
paradoxical nature of law as it relates to transitional justice: “In its ordinary social function,
law provides order and stability, but in extraordinary periods of political upheaval, law
maintains order even as it enables transformation.” TEITEL, supra note 202, at 6.
215. Bassiouni, supra note 203, at 8.
216. See id.
217. See id.
218. See id.
219. See id.; Gordon, supra note 106, at 678–79.
220. Parts III and IV focus solely on Saif’s case because Al-Senussi’s situation is
significantly more uncertain. Al-Senussi was captured in Mauritania on March 17, 2012, but
his ultimate destination is unclear; Libya, France, and the ICC all seek to extradite and
prosecute him. See Laurent Prieur & Taha Zargoun, Libya Says Gaddafi Spy Chief Arrested
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A. Libya’s Current Political and Legal Landscape
After forty-two years of oppression and nine months of revolution, Libya
finally liberated itself from Muammar Gaddafi’s reign on October 23,
2011. 221 The National Transitional Council (NTC), the interim government
established on March 5, 2011 to guide Libya through the conflict and
toward a permanent democratic government, 222 has begun the process of
stabilizing the nation. On October 31, 2011, its fifty-one members elected
Abdel Rahim el-Keeb to the position of interim prime minister.223
According to the timeline the NTC established for itself, el-Keeb and his
cabinet are charged with conducting elections by June 2012 for an interim
national assembly. 224 That assembly will then spend one year drafting a
new constitution, which it will put to a referendum in mid-2013. 225 Around
that same time, the NTC also hopes to have a full parliamentary election. 226
But while Libya is moving toward a permanent, stable democracy, the
current state of affairs indicates that the road to that end is not without
bumps. 227 Despite Gaddafi’s death and Libya’s formal liberation, 228 much
of the violence continues. 229 For instance, many local militias who fought
to overthrow Gaddafi have refused to put down their weapons until an
elected government is freely and fairly established.230 As a result, fighting
in Mauritania, REUTERS (Mar. 17, 2012, 6:56 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/03/
17/us-libya-senussi-idUSBRE82G07Q20120317. Meanwhile, Saif is in custody in Libya.
See infra notes 247–48 and accompanying text.
221. Libya — Revolution and Aftermath, supra note 5 (“The country was formally
declared liberated three days [after Gaddafi’s death].”).
222. LIBYAN INTERIM NAT’L COUNCIL, http://www.ntclibya.org/english/ (last visited Mar.
23, 2012).
223. David D. Kirkpatrick, Libya Names an Engineer as Premier, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 1,
2011, at A11. El-Keeb succeeded the NTC’s first prime minister, Mahmoud Jibril, who had
promised to resign after Libya’s formal liberation from Gaddafi’s rule. Id.
224. Id. This assembly will consist of roughly 200 people. Alastair Macdonald, Fearing
Libya Vacuum, Ex-PM Urges Rapid Vote, REUTERS (Nov. 16, 2011, 10:45 AM),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/11/16/us-libya-jibril-idUSTRE7AF16S20111116.
225. See Macdonald, supra note 224. Jibril, the former interim prime minister, has
spoken out against this plan for fear that any delay in establishing a permanent government
will only subject the nation to more insecurity. See id. As an alternative plan, Jibril proposes
that the unelected NTC expand to about 130 members by including representatives from
various factions within the country, and then draft a constitution. See id.
226. See id.
227. See, e.g., Moni Basu, Libyans Face Tough Challenges in Building a New Nation,
CNN (Jan. 26, 2012), http://articles.cnn.com/2012-01-26/africa/world_africa_libyachallenges_1_national-transitional-council-libyan-cities-libyan-uprising?_s=PM:AFRICA
(noting various “signs that Libya faces challenges on several fronts as it struggles to craft a
new nation from the ashes of tyranny”).
228. See supra notes 5–7 and accompanying text.
229. See, e.g., Liam Stack, Pro-government Libyan Militia Routed from a Qaddafi
Bastion, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 25, 2012, at A10 (describing one violent episode that represents a
“renewed conflict between revolutionary forces and those supportive of [Gaddafi]”).
230. David D. Kirkpatrick, In Libya, Fighting May Outlast the Revolution, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 2, 2011, at A4 (“Many members of military councils insist that they need to stay armed
until a new constitution is ratified because they do not trust the weak provisional government
to steer Libya to democracy on its own.”); Mark Lowen, Libya’s Ex-rebels Reluctant to
Down Arms, BBC NEWS (Jan. 6, 2012, 8:49 PM), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa16443441.
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in some parts of the country has continued between these militias and a few
remaining Gaddafi loyalists. 231 And with the country’s first true national
army only in its infancy, putting down these skirmishes and ending the
fragmentation the militias represent appears a long way off. 232
Further preventing the NTC from fully stabilizing the country are the
revenge killings that these militias and other vigilantes have embarked on
against people thought to have supported Gaddafi. 233 At the site of one
such killing, plastic ties were found next to the victims’ bodies, suggesting
that militia members tied the victims’ hands behind their backs before
executing them. 234 Although the NTC has denounced this kind of conduct
as antithetical to its central mission, and has urged its citizens to use the
justice system for redress, it has nevertheless been slow to investigate, let
alone stop, this behavior. 235
Another problem facing the NTC is that even if people heeded its
instructions and sought retribution in the justice system, it is unclear if a
proper legal system exists that can adequately handle these disputes.236
Under Gaddafi, Libya’s judicial system mirrored its political system in that
everything revolved around the leader. 237 During his reign, the country’s
“constitution” consisted essentially of Gaddafi’s personal book of political
thoughts, and “trials” more closely resembled tribal negotiations than
formal proceedings. 238 Now, after over four decades of deliberate
repression and erosion of the nation’s public institutions, observers worry
that Libya lacks a viable judicial system. 239
As for the makeshift judicial system that is in place, concerns abound
regarding its treatment of prisoners and its adherence to due process
231. See Kirkpatrick, supra note 230 (describing reports of sporadic skirmishes between
local militias); see also Basu, supra note 227 (noting that as frustration continues to grow
throughout the country, “[c]lashes between pro- and anti-Gadhafi forces have turned lethal”).
232. See Clifford Krauss, Libya Tries to Build Army that Can March Straight and Defang
Militias, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 22, 2011, at A4. A captain in the new army expressed doubt
about its ability to successfully get these militias to surrender their guns, and noted that
stability in Libya is unlikely until this happens. Id.; see also Anthony Shadid, Libya
Struggles to Curb Militias as Chaos Grows, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 9, 2012, at A1.
233. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 1, at 599 (“Revenge attacks against
populations deemed to have supported Gaddafi also grew in September and October.”);
Maria Golovnina, Analysis: Cycle of Revenge Hangs over Libya’s Fragile Peace, REUTERS
(Oct. 31, 2011, 8:08 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/10/31/us-libya-revengeidUSTRE79U1OF20111031.
234. Kareem Fahim & Adam Nossiter, In Libya, Massacre Site Is Cleaned Up, Not
Investigated, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 25, 2011, at A4.
235. See id.
236. See Francois Murphy, Libya Vows It, Not ICC, Will Try Saif, Senussi, REUTERS
(Nov. 20, 2011, 10:32 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/11/21/us-libya-iccidUSTRE7AK08K20111121.
237. See Golovnina, supra note 233.
238. See id.
239. See Fahim & Nossiter, supra note 234. However, on November 8, 2011, a Tunisian
appeals court approved the extradition of Gaddafi’s former prime minister to Libya. Before
entering this order, the judge expressly considered human rights concerns raised by human
rights groups and foreign government related to treatment of Gaddafi loyalists. See Libya —
Revolution and Aftermath, supra note 5.
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principles. 240 First, there are numerous reports that detainees from the
revolution currently held in Libyan prisons are being tortured and subjected
to human rights abuses. 241 Also, according to Amnesty International, many
of the over 8,000 detainees 242 were arrested without a warrant and without
any legitimate reason whatsoever, other than being thought to have
supported Gaddafi. 243 The NTC does not officially condone this conduct,
nor does it directly control these detention centers. 244 But despite their
knowledge of these alleged abuses, Libyan authorities have been powerless
to stop them. 245
B. The ICC’s Involvement in Libya
The issues regarding Libya’s social, political, and legal stability are on
full display as the ICC seeks to determine how to handle the trial of Saif AlIslam, Gaddafi’s son and former de facto prime minister. Saif, who faces
charges from the ICC for crimes against humanity, 246 was captured by a
local militia on November 19, 2011 and has been detained in the Libyan
town of Zintan ever since. 247 But while the President of the ICC’s
Assembly of States Parties has publicly lauded the Libyan authorities for
arresting Saif, 248 and for “tak[ing] a major step towards ensuring
240. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 1, at 599 (reporting sub-standard prison
conditions and “consistent reports of abuse, including beatings and some use of electric
shock”).
241. See Libya: Protesters Accuse Prison Officials of Mistreating Pro-Qaddafi
Detainees, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4, 2011, at A6.
242. See Liam Stack, Qaddafi Son Being Held by Rebels, Rights Group Says, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 21, 2011, at A12. According to human rights activists who visited Libya, none of these
8,000 prisoners have had a trial date set by the Libyan government, and none have had
access to a lawyer. Id.
243. See AMNESTY INT’L, DETENTION ABUSES STAINING THE NEW LIBYA 5–8 (2011),
available at http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/MDE19/036/2011/en/e1c30d0f-8ec34368-8537-03f1bb15a051/mde190362011en.pdf.
244. See Libya: Protesters Accuse Prison Officials of Mistreating Pro-Qaddafi
Detainees, supra note 241.
245. See AMNESTY INT’L, supra note 243, at 5 (describing, in particular, an example of
prison officials purposely ignoring release orders given by judicial police and prosecution).
But see Member States Vote to Reinstate Libya as Member of UN Human Rights Council,
UN NEWS CENTRE (Nov. 18, 2011), http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=
40438&Cr=libya&Cr1= (“United Nations Member States voted overwhelmingly . . . to
readmit Libya as a member of the UN Human Rights Council . . . [due to Libya’s] recent
commitments . . . to promote and protect human rights, democracy and the rule of law . . .
.”).
246. See Prosecutor v. Gaddafi, Case No. ICC-01/11, Warrant of Arrest for Saif Al-Islam
Gaddafi, at 6 (June 27, 2011), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1101345.pdf (charging
him for the crime of murder within the meaning of article 7(1)(a) of the Rome Statute, and
persecution within the meaning of article 7(1)(h) of the Rome Statute).
247. See Stack, supra note 242.
248. It is unclear how much control Libya’s central government had over Saif’s initial
capture, and how much control it now has over his detention. It appears that a local militia
from the mountain town of Zintan is responsible for his arrest, and are the ones now
detaining him, in cooperation with the NTC. See id. (quoting a representative from Human
Rights Watch, who explains that “[i]t is not accurate to say [Saif] is being held by a militia
outside of government control, although it is not true that he is in a prison directly controlled
by the government, either”).
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accountability” 249 in their regime, it remains to be seen whether the ICC
will actually allow Libyan domestic courts to handle Saif’s trial, as Libyan
leaders and citizens urge, 250 or whether the uncertainties surrounding the
new government and the perceived need for swift and efficient justice
necessitate that the ICC conduct the trial. 251 As the ICC’s Chief Prosecutor
explained to the Libyan authorities during a November 2011 visit, the
present circumstances provide several options for bringing Saif to
justice. 252
The first option is for the Libyan judicial system to try Saif itself.253
Since Saif’s capture, and especially during the Prosecutor’s November trip
to Libya, Libyan authorities have stated that this is their desired course of
action, citing the significance that such a trial would have for Libyans and
for the future of the country more generally. 254 However, the Prosecutor
and the ICC have made clear that Libya’s desire to try Saif does not
automatically give the Libyans that privilege. 255 Despite urgings from the
Libyan authorities that they are committed to conducting a fair trial in
accordance with international law standards, 256 the ICC has repeatedly
emphasized that the decision is not for the Libyan government to make. 257
Pursuant to articles 17 and 19 of the Rome Statute, Libya must formally

249. See Press Release, Assembly of States Parties, President of the Assembly of States
Parties Welcomes Arrest of Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi (Nov. 19, 2011), http://www.icccpi.int/NR/exeres/2243BC6E-B58C-4A8A-9B21-D309E49AE5AC.htm.
250. See Rami Al-Shaheibi, Gaddafi’s Son Saif al-Islam Seized in Southern Libya, TIME
(Nov. 19, 2011, 11:00 AM), http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2099886,
00.html (citing Libya’s Informational Minister Mahmoud Shammam); Murphy, supra note
236 (citing an interview with Libya’s interim justice minister Mohammed al-Alagi).
251. See Al-Shaheibi, supra note 250 (citing a member of Amnesty International who
emphasized that in order for Saif to be brought to justice as quickly as possible, he must be
handed over to the ICC).
252. See Prosecution’s Submissions, supra note 11, ¶¶ 7–9. The Court has already
decided that Saif’s case falls within its jurisdiction. See Prosecutor v. Gaddafi, Case No.
ICC-01/11, Decision on the Prosecutor’s Application Pursuant to Article 58 as to Muammar
Mohammed Abu Minyar Gaddafi, Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi and Abdullah Al-Senussi, ¶ 10
(June 27, 2011), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1101337.pdf; see also supra notes
118–28.
253. See Prosecution’s Submissions, supra note 11, ¶ 7.
254. See id. ¶ 4; Murphy, supra note 236; Arrest of Qadhafi’s Son Vital ‘for the Future of
Justice in Libya’ — UN Human Rights Chief, UN NEWS CENTRE (Nov. 21, 2011),
http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=40464&Cr=libya&Cr1=.
255. See Prosecution’s Submissions, supra note 11, ¶ 4; Press Release, Int’l Criminal
Court, Course of Action Before the ICC Following the Arrest of the Suspect Saif Al Islam
Gaddafi in Libya (Nov. 23, 2011), http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/exeres/48F6B130-EC14-4A51BC79-1CCF8633E270.htm; see also Saif al-Islam Gaddafi Could Be Tried in Libya, Says
ICC Prosecutor, GUARDIAN (Nov. 22, 2011, 10:14 AM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/
2011/nov/22/saif-al-islam-gaddafi-trial-libya (quoting the ICC Chief Prosecutor, who
emphasized that Libya may prosecute Saif only if it complies with ICC standards).
256. See Prosecution’s Submissions, supra note 11, ¶ 5.
257. See id. ¶ 7; Public Redacted Version of “OPCD Observations on Libya’s
Submissions Regarding the Arrest of Saif Al-Islam” ¶ 5, Prosecutor v. Gaddafi, ICC-01/1101/11 (Feb. 3, 2012) [hereinafter OPCD Observations], available at http://www.icccpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1326934.pdf (emphasizing that the ICC retains jurisdiction over the
case until a formal admissibility challenge is made).
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challenge the admissibility of Saif’s case to the ICC; 258 only if ICC judges
are satisfied that Libya displays an adequate commitment to justice will
Libya be permitted to try Saif at home. 259 If, however, the ICC deems the
case admissible, or if Libya does not challenge the admissibility issue, then
the case is in the ICC’s hands. 260
Even with control over the case, the ICC Prosecutor has stated that there
might nevertheless be opportunities for the ICC and Libya to cooperate in
the trial process. 261 The first option for cooperation would be to sequence
trials, which would allow Libya to fully investigate and try Saif for crimes
unrelated to the ICC’s charges before handing him over to the ICC, where
he would then be tried for the more serious crimes with which he is
charged. 262 The second option would be for the ICC to actually conduct its
trial of Saif in Libya. 263 However, neither of these options appears to
interest Libyan authorities as much as prosecuting Saif themselves in
domestic courts. 264
IV. RECONCILING THE SITUATION IN LIBYA WITH THE ICC’S GOALS
AND UNDERLYING PRINCIPLES
As the situation in Libya continues to develop, and decisions about how
to bring Saif (and eventually others) to justice loom, the ICC faces a critical
juncture that could define how it operates and its place within the
international criminal justice community. Recognizing the opportunity
before the ICC, and taking into account the Court’s founding principles and
ultimate goals, this part proposes a comprehensive solution to the problem
of where and how to try Saif al-Islam Gaddafi.
Part IV.A begins by outlining how the Court is likely to approach the
question of whether Saif’s case is admissible. Part IV.B then argues that,
despite the attention it is receiving, the question of admissibility should not
ultimately be the determinative one in deciding where and how to bring Saif
to justice. In addition to admissibility, Part IV.B.1 contends that the ICC’s
underlying principles and goals should dictate its course of action with
258. See supra notes 161–66 and accompanying text (describing the process by which
Libya can challenge the admissibility of the case).
259. See Prosecution’s Submissions, supra note 11, ¶ 7; Press Release, supra note 255.
260. See Prosecution’s Submissions, supra note 11, ¶¶ 7–9.
261. See id.; see also Saif al-Islam Gaddafi Could Be Tried in Libya, Says ICC
Prosecutor, supra note 255 (“[Libya has] decided to [try to prosecute Saif], and that is why
[the ICC is] here—to learn and to understand what they are doing and to co-operate.”).
However, even though Libya has asked the ICC to “provide advice and . . . monitor [their]
domestic proceedings,” the Prosecutor has made clear that “it is not within the mandate of
the Office of the Prosecutor to serve as advisor or to monitor a domestic trial.” Prosecution’s
Submissions, supra note 11, ¶¶ 6–7.
262. See id. ¶¶ 5, 8 (citing Rome Statute, supra note 79, art. 94). Libyan authorities are
currently investigating Saif for corruption that occurred prior to the February 2011
revolution. See Stack, supra note 242.
263. See Prosecution’s Submissions, supra note 11, ¶ 9; Murphy, supra note 236. The
Rome Statute allows the Court to sit in an alternate location if it so desires. Rome Statute,
supra note 79, art. 3(3).
264. Cf. Prosecution’s Submissions, supra note 11, ¶ 9.

2012]

LIBYA AND THE ICC

2299

respect to Saif. And that course of action, Part IV.B.2 argues, should be to
try Saif in Libya with the help and cooperation of the Libyan judicial
system.
A. The Admissibility of Saif’s Case
At the heart of the Court’s mandate is the requirement that every case it
adjudicates must be admissible. 265 Understanding how the ICC will and
should proceed with respect to Saif’s case thus requires some attention to
the question of its admissibility. This section outlines how the Court will
likely approach that question and highlights the salient issues the Court will
need to consider in answering it. 266
Given the circumstances surrounding Libya and this case, as well as the
criteria under which the ICC will examine those circumstances, the Court’s
admissibility analysis will likely be very complicated. Pursuant to article
17, the first issue the Court will have to address is whether Libya is
currently investigating Saif’s case in a way that indicates that it is “[willing]
genuinely to carry out the investigation [and eventual] prosecution.”267
Even though Libya’s investigation against Saif is experiencing some
delay, 268 it does not appear to be the kind of delay that is “inconsistent with
an intent to bring [him] to justice”—which is what article 17 requires in
order for the Court to come to an “unwilling” determination.269 In fact, by
all accounts, Libyans seem intent on ensuring that Saif is brought to
justice. 270
The more interesting and controversial aspect of the Court’s admissibility
determination will be assessed under article 17(1)(a)’s “unable” prong. On
one hand, there is strong evidence that Libya will be unable genuinely to
carry out an investigation and prosecution in a way that is truly consistent
with justice and international due process standards. For one, Libya’s
current legal and judicial infrastructure is limited. 271 Of the infrastructure
265. See supra note 130 and accompanying text (noting the admissibility requirement);
supra notes 96–97 and accompanying text (describing the significance and textual origins of
the principle of complementarity); supra notes 131–33 and accompanying text (describing
that the admissibility regime directly implements the principle of complementarity into the
Statute).
266. The Court may never actually have to issue a formal admissibility ruling. See supra
note 162 (observing that as a general matter “the Court is not obligated to make a formal
admissibility ruling”); note 161 and accompanying text (observing that article 18’s process
of conducting a preliminary admissibility ruling does not apply to Security Council
referrals); note 10 (indicating that Saif’s case began with a Security Council referral).
However, given Libya’s strong desire to try Saif at home, see supra notes 250, 254 and
accompanying text, it appears likely that Libyan officials will eventually challenge the case’s
admissibility pursuant to article 19.
267. See supra notes 142–43 and accompanying text.
268. See OPCD Observations, supra note 257, ¶ 5 (indicating how little information
regarding the investigation Libya has provided to the ICC, and that the information it has
provided has been delayed); id. ¶ 34 (“There is no indication or evidence that the current
domestic investigation against [Saif] had commenced at the time of his arrest.”).
269. See supra note 143 and accompanying text.
270. See supra notes 250, 254 and accompanying text.
271. See supra notes 236–39 and accompanying text.
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that is in place, reporters and human rights groups have raised grave
concerns about its adequacy in protecting prisoners and conducting fair and
efficient proceedings. 272 Moreover, adding to these general concerns is
information suggesting that Saif’s detention in particular has failed to
provide some basic due process protections—namely, Saif’s captors have
not allowed him to see a lawyer or talk to family members, and it is even
unclear whether he is being detained pursuant to a valid arrest warrant.273
On the other hand, important members of the international community
have praised the Libyan government for its commitment to defending
human rights and the promise it has shown thus far to that end.274 Also,
because the bar for demonstrating “inability” is meant to be high, “as the
ICC is not a human rights monitoring body, and its role is not to ensure
perfect procedures and compliance with all international standards,” 275 the
ICC judges might very well be reticent to conclude that the aforementioned
concerns rise to the level necessary to constitute “a total or substantial
collapse or unavailability of [Libya’s] national judicial system,” or that
those concerns demonstrate that Libya is “otherwise unable to carry out
[Saif’s] proceedings.” 276 Weighing these factors against the arguments that
Libya will be unable to effectively and fairly bring Saif to justice, the Court
faces a difficult decision with respect to the admissibility of Saif’s case.
Given the ICC’s founding principles and goals, however, the Court’s course
of action in Libya need not turn on that decision.
B. The Decision of Where and How to Try Saif Should Be Governed by the
Court’s Founding Principles and Goals, Not by the Case’s Admissibility
While the admissibility requirement is certainly an important part of the
principle of complementarity, 277 this Comment has sought to demonstrate
that admissibility is but one aspect of the complementarity regime. 278 As
such, the issue of admissibility should not be the sole factor in determining
where and how Saif will see justice. Instead, in deciding this issue, the
Court should look to its underlying purpose, and allow that purpose to
shape its conceptualization of complementarity in a new, more proactive
direction. Part IV.B.1 explores the Court’s underlying purpose and explains
how a proactive approach to complementarity better helps fulfill that
purpose, and Part IV.B.2 then applies that approach to Saif’s case and
proposes a plan for bringing him to justice.

272. See supra notes 240–43 and accompanying text.
273. See OPCD Observations, supra note 257, ¶¶ 2, 15.
274. See supra note 245 (observing that the U.N. General Assembly recently readmitted
Libya to its Human Rights Council).
275. See INFORMAL EXPERT PAPER, supra note 102, ¶ 49.
276. See supra note 146 and accompanying text.
277. See supra notes 129–46 and accompanying text.
278. See supra Parts I.B.3, II.A.
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1. The Court’s Ultimate Goals Are Most Effectively Achieved
Through the Concept of Proactive Complementarity
As discussed above, the ICC was founded on the notions that impunity
for the world’s most serious crimes must end, and that violators of these
crimes must never be allowed to escape justice. 279 But when the ICC
became part of the international criminal justice landscape almost a decade
ago, it entered into a preexisting system of domestic courts and other types
of international tribunals that was also designed to bring about this end.280
The idea behind the ICC’s creation was that the Court would supplement
those existing mechanisms and provide an avenue for justice when the
Reflecting that idea, the principle of
others failed to do so. 281
complementarity thus guides the Court’s work. 282
But to so narrowly conceptualize the Court’s ultimate goal of ending
impunity, its guiding principle of complementarity, and the relationship
between the two is to overlook the broader purpose that the ICC should
serve. The Court extends beyond prosecuting and adjudicating individual
criminal cases for the sake of providing justice and peace instance-byinstance.
More fundamentally, its purpose, as recognized by
commentators, 283 the ICC President, 284 and the Rome Statute,285 is to end
impunity for the world’s most serious crimes altogether. 286 Ideally, that
goal is achieved by building a system of domestic courts that are so
interconnected, efficient, and committed to achieving justice that,
ultimately, every case is prosecuted at the domestic level and thus every
case becomes inadmissible for the ICC. 287 Essentially, the ICC’s long-term
goal, as the ICC’s first Chief Prosecutor recognized, should be to make
itself irrelevant. 288
For the ICC to make that goal a reality, a number of requirements and
considerations come into play—considerations that touch on transitional
justice issues and require a broader, proactive approach to
complementarity. 289 Practically speaking, creating a global system of
interconnected domestic courts fundamentally requires that individual
domestic legal systems be properly equipped with the requisite competence,
sophistication, and commitment to justice that the ICC and international
criminal justice community demand. And in the context of countries that
are emerging from conflict and seeking transitional justice, that competence

279. See supra notes 198–202 and accompanying text.
280. See supra Part I.A (discussing the nature of, and relationship between, international
tribunals, hybrid tribunals, and domestic courts).
281. See supra notes 96–112 and accompanying text.
282. See supra notes 96–112 and accompanying text.
283. See supra note 202 and accompanying text.
284. See supra note 209 and accompanying text.
285. See supra note 209 and accompanying text.
286. See supra notes 201–02 and accompanying text.
287. See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
288. See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
289. See supra notes 175–81 and accompanying text.
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and commitment can only truly be developed by giving the society an
opportunity to address its past crimes directly and to heal from them. 290
In building this system over the long term, the ICC will thus be required
to balance the objective due process standards to which the international
community is committed with the subjective, individualized needs of
countries in dire need of criminal justice.291 The only way for the ICC to
satisfy both requirements is for it to actively cooperate with domestic legal
systems in investigating and prosecuting cases. 292 Creating this dynamic
within the confines of the Rome Statute requires an acknowledgment that
the principle of complementarity does more than just tell the Court when it
may not do something. 293 Instead, the Court must be able to follow some
of the ideas of commentators 294 and experts 295 and use the principle of
complementarity proactively as a mechanism that empowers it to help
domestic states achieve justice on their own terms. 296 Adopting such an
interpretation of the complementarity principle would, in the short term,
ensure that justice is attained adequately and in line with international
standards. In the long term, it would help build up domestic legal systems
to the point where the ICC’s help is no longer needed.
2. Using the Concept of Proactive Complementarity, the Court Should
Ensure a Fair Trial for Saif in Libya with the Help and Involvement
of Libyan Authorities
Due to its obligations 297 and limited resources, 298 the ICC cannot and
should not transform itself from a court of international criminal law into a
nation-building institution. But the ICC should make it a priority to assist
states, in some circumstances, in bringing the world’s most serious
criminals to justice. This section proposes a way for the ICC and Libya to
cooperate in light of these goals, considerations, and limitations. This plan
emphasizes that Saif should be tried for his crimes against humanity in
Libya by some combination of both ICC and Libyan prosecutors and
judges.
Regardless of how the ICC judges ultimately rule on the question of
admissibility, the first priority in bringing Saif to justice should be to try
him in Libya. The importance of trying Saif in Libya, in front of the Libyan
people, stems from Libya’s need to face its past and exact justice from a

290. See supra notes 212–19 and accompanying text.
291. See supra notes 213–19 and accompanying text (referring to transitional justice
principles).
292. See supra note 176 and accompanying text.
293. See supra note 175 and accompanying text (providing a basic definition of proactive
complementarity).
294. See supra notes 175–85 and accompanying text.
295. See supra notes 178–96 and accompanying text.
296. See supra notes 213–16 and accompanying text.
297. See supra notes 82–83 and accompanying text.
298. See supra notes 108–09 and accompanying text.
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person, and a regime, that caused the nation so much harm. 299 As an
important part of Gaddafi’s regime, Saif not only was a direct participant
and coordinator of the February 2011 violence, 300 but he is also seen,
following Gaddafi’s death, as a symbol of that regime and of all the pain it
inflicted on the Libyan people.301 Thus, in order for Libya to emerge from
its most recent conflict fully healed, it is important that the Libyan people
see and feel that justice in their country. 302
If Saif’s case is inadmissible, then it will be tried in Libya, because his
case will be entirely in the hands of the Libyan government. 303 If the case
turns out to be admissible, however, the ICC should utilize article 3 of the
Rome Statute 304 and, as the Prosecutor has suggested, 305 conduct the trial in
Libya instead of The Hague. In the event that the case is admissible, taking
this step to nevertheless try it in Libya has the additional benefit of
providing an example for Libya’s troubled306 judicial system to follow as it
develops.
In addition to trying Saif’s case in Libya, it is also incredibly important
that members of the Libyan judicial system participate alongside ICC
personnel, or vice versa, throughout the course of the investigation and trial.
Such cooperation would satisfy both Libya’s need to heal and develop itself
in the long term, 307 as well as the international criminal justice
community’s need to try Saif efficiently and fairly in the short term. 308 In
effect, the ICC should follow the suggestion proposed in the Office of the
Prosecutor’s informal expert paper on complementarity, and use the trial as
an opportunity to train Libyan prosecutors and judges in how to conduct a
high-profile international criminal case. 309
If the case is admissible, then for reasons of fairness, due process, or
security, the ICC prosecutors and judges will need to have primary control
over it. 310 In such a scenario, then, the Court should invite members of the
Libyan judicial system to observe and participate in the trial’s various
stages. If, on the other hand, the case is inadmissible, and the ICC
relinquishes complete control of the case over to Libya, the ICC should
nevertheless assist the Libyans to the extent that they request it, 311 as long
299. See supra note 208 and accompanying text (noting the importance, from a
transitional justice perspective, of holding criminals from past regimes accountable).
300. See supra note 246 and accompanying text.
301. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
302. See supra note 207 and accompanying text.
303. Cf. supra notes 130–31 and accompanying text (describing the admissibility
requirement for the ICC to hear a case).
304. See supra note 263 and accompanying text.
305. See supra note 263 and accompanying text.
306. If the case is deemed to be admissible, that necessarily means that the ICC detects
some problem with either Libya’s ability or willingness to try the case pursuant to
international law standards. See supra notes 129–47 and accompanying text.
307. See supra note 227 and accompanying text.
308. See supra notes 251–52 and accompanying text.
309. See supra note 191 and accompanying text.
310. See supra notes 142–43 and accompanying text.
311. See supra note 261 and accompanying text.
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as such assistance does not develop into the ICC effectively conducting the
prosecution itself. 312
Even though this kind of assistance or training would be beyond the
Rome Statute’s express instructions, 313 and beyond what the Chief
Prosecutor has said he is willing to do,314 it nevertheless makes sense for
this kind of cooperation to take place, considering the ICC’s long-term
interest in building up Libya’s judicial system 315 and Libya’s current
deficiencies. 316 Thus, for these reasons and in these ways, the mechanism
that prosecutes Saif, whether it is primarily the ICC or primarily a Libyan
court, should act like a hybrid tribunal 317 and incorporate both international
and domestic components.
CONCLUSION
Facing a decision on how to proceed with the situation in Libya, the ICC
is in a very significant place in its short life. In its decision, the Court will
be forced to reconcile the central concepts on which it was founded—
ending impunity for the world’s most serious crimes and the principle of
complementarity—with the complicated circumstances in Libya. But while
the solutions to the problems Libya poses are not readily apparent from the
plain text of the Rome Statute, this Comment has argued that by reconceptualizing some of its own basic principles, the Court can reach a
satisfying conclusion for itself, Libya, and the international criminal justice
community.
While the ultimate success or failure of the Court does not rest on what it
decides to do in Libya, the Libya situation nevertheless provides an
opportunity for the Court to demonstrate how it intends to interpret its
fundamental goals and founding principles moving forward. Properly
taking advantage of that opportunity will require the Court to think
creatively, and in a way that brings Libya and the ICC together in a
cooperative effort toward justice.

312. See supra note 193 and accompanying text.
313. See supra note 192 and accompanying text.
314. See supra note 261 (indicating the Prosecutor’s reluctance to advise Libya and
monitor a trial if the case is deemed inadmissible).
315. See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
316. See supra notes 230–45 and accompanying text.
317. See supra Part I.A.2.

